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COMPENSATORY MITIGATION  
AND PUBLIC LANDS 
JUSTIN R. PIDOT* 
Abstract: The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manages America’s public 
lands for a multiplicity of uses and values. This effort requires difficult tradeoffs, 
because allowing one use, like oil drilling, will displace others, like recreation or 
wildlife habitat. Compensatory mitigation—the practice of requiring land users 
to offset their environmental harms—provides an important mechanism for ad-
dressing use conflicts, by enabling intensive development in designated areas, 
while conserving the ecological integrity of public lands as a whole. Despite its 
potential to balance competing interests in public lands, compensatory mitigation 
has come under fire. Former Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke described compensa-
tory mitigation as “un-American” and “extortion,” and under his leadership, the 
BLM disclaimed authority to require it, never mind that the agency had done so 
for decades. The policy has persisted under the leadership of Secretary David 
Bernhardt. This Article examines the history of public land law, the development 
of environmental mitigation policies across the federal government, and three in-
terlocking provisions of Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976—the 
Multiple Use Mandate, the Land Use Planning Mandate, and the Anti-
Degradation Mandate—to reveal that the BLM has ample authority to require 
compensatory mitigation. It then assesses the circumstances in which resource 
users can appropriately be required to offset the impacts of their uses. 
INTRODUCTION 
America’s public lands are as diverse as its people. They include rugged 
mountains, pristine lakes, and ancient forests; ski resorts, world-class white-
water rivers, and off-road vehicle destinations; battlefields, modern-day memo-
rials, and archeological sites documenting millennia of human habitation; 
wildlife habitat and ecosystems that function as carbon sinks and water supply; 
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open-pit mines, oil fields, wind farms, and cattle pasturage.1 Americans view 
public lands from similarly diverse perspectives: they may represent economic 
opportunity to a miner, tradition to a rancher, the ultimate playground to a dirt 
bike enthusiast, and a solemn moral obligation to a preservationist. Public 
lands include hallowed grounds for many Native American tribes and provide 
opportunities for their members to engage in traditional hunting, gathering, 
cultural, and religious activities passed down from time immemorial.2 
The federal government has recognized these interests to varying degrees 
over its history. Under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Congress 
wields plenary power over public lands,3 and as the Supreme Court explained 
at the turn of the twentieth century, the United States holds them “in trust for 
the people of the whole country.”4 The federal government has often fallen far 
short of that lofty aspiration, taking a crabbed view of who should be consid-
ered and for what purposes. Corruption, racism, ignorance, and neglect have 
sometimes been the rule rather than the exception, as the United States seized 
the traditional homelands of Native American tribes and, for many years, sold 
or gave away those lands to predominantly white settlers, corporations, and 
land speculators.5 At the direction of Congress, more than one billion acres of 
public lands were transferred out of federal ownership to state governments, 
businesses, and individuals.6 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., U.S. Public Land Law Review Comm’n, One Third of the Nation’s Land 28–29 
(1970) [hereinafter One Third of the Nation’s Land] (describing the “great diversity” of public lands). 
 2 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9558, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Jan. 5, 2017). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States 
. . . .”); see Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987) (“[T]he Property 
Clause gives Congress plenary power to legislate the use of the federal land . . . .”). Although Con-
gress’s authority is plenary, it is not always exclusive. States may regulate public lands so long as they 
do not conflict with federal law. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 480 U.S. at 593. 
 4 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (quoting United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 
137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890)); see id. at 536 (“It is true that the ‘United States do not and cannot hold 
property as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes.’” (quoting Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 
117 U.S. 151, 158 (1886))). 
 5 See, e.g., Trina Williams Shanks, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in Ameri-
can History, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20, 34 
(Michael Sherraden ed., 2005) (“Ironically, black men who served on the Union side during the war 
and even remained enlisted as Buffalo Soldiers to help protect settlers on the frontier from outlaws 
and Indian attacks were denied the opportunity to make land claims in some of the very communities 
they fought to defend.”); Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Ex-
propriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2000) (“One of the most criti-
cal deprivations that the American Indians suffered at the hands of the United States was the loss of 
their lands.”). 
 6 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 2017, 
at 5 (2018) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS] (identifying disposition of almost 1.3 billion acres 
between 1781 and 2017); Comment, Management of Public Land Resources, 60 YALE L.J. 455, 458 
(1951). 
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Until the end of the nineteenth century, the dominant paradigm of public 
land law remained privatization.7 As the Progressive Era of American politics 
dawned, Congress began to adjust course, deciding—in fits and starts—that 
public lands should remain in federal ownership and be managed for the bene-
fit of the public, rather than for private profit.8 In 1976, Congress enacted the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) as a paragon of this new 
course.9 FLPMA is sometimes referred to as the organic act of the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM).10 The BLM manages over one-tenth of the total sur-
face area of the United States and almost one-third of minerals and soils, more 
than any other federal agency.11 It generally directs that “public lands be retained 
in Federal ownership” and be managed for “multiple use and sustained yield” 
that “will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.”12 
Multiple use management requires tradeoffs.13 An area of public lands 
may be rich in oil resources, biodiversity, and recreational opportunities. Des-
ignating the area for drilling will displace trails. Drilling and intensive recrea-
tion may frighten wildlife or degrade the quality of habitat.14 To be sure, man-
agement decisions need not always be absolute.15 Perhaps, with careful plan-
ning, oil companies, recreationists, and wildlife can all be accommodated, at 
least to an extent. For example, placing drilling rigs at concealed spots may 
reduce harm to hikers seeking natural vistas and restricting operations at sensi-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land Conservation: A 
Cautionary Essay, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599, 602 (2002) (discussing history of public land law). 
 8 See infra Part II.A. 
 9 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 82 Stat. 197 (1976) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 
(2018)). FLPMA did not, however, entirely end privatization of public lands because it left largely in 
place the rights of prospectors to claim certain mineral resources on public lands under the 1872 Min-
ing Law, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2018), and established new mechanisms for land exchanges and sales in 
narrow circumstances. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1716. 
 10 See Michael Burger, A Carbon Fee as Mitigation for Fossil Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands, 
42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 295, 316–17 (2017) (describing FLPMA and “BLM’s Organic Act”); Eleanor 
R. Schwartz, A Capsule Examination of the Legislative History of the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 285 (1979) (describing FLPMA as “much more than an 
organic act”). 
 11 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: INFORMATION ON LAND OWNED AND 
ON ACREAGE WITH CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS 8 (1995); Our Mission, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
https://www.blm.gov/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/CHR6-NY7C]. 
 12 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1); see also id. § 1701(a)(7) (establishing national policy for public land 
management); id. § 1702(c) (defining “multiple use”). 
 13 See, e.g., W. Energy All. v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 1157, 1169 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that “under 
the multiple-use mandate,” the BLM “is required to balance wide-ranging and often conflicting inter-
ests”). 
 14 See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 505–06 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (addressing mitigation measures designed to address oil and gas development’s harm to wild-
life). 
 15 For examples of the Obama Administration’s effort to use compensatory mitigation as a com-
ponent of public land management, see infra notes 107–116 and accompanying text. 
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tive times of year or closing hiking trails during mating season may reduce 
wildlife disturbance. Careful management decisions, then, can overcome what 
may appear to be a zero-sum game in which some uses of public lands must be 
sacrificed so others can flourish. Each use may suffer to a degree—because 
some lands are either unavailable or less desirable and activities must conform 
to restrictions. But all can also occur to some extent, creating the potential for 
greater net social benefit than dedicating the area to a single use. 
Serious limitations exist, however, on the extent to which carefully struc-
turing activities can reconcile conflicts. No matter the steps taken, using public 
lands will often degrade them, sometimes a great deal. Constructing an open-
pit phosphate mine in sagebrush country is simply incompatible with sage-
grouse convening for their famed mating rituals at locations within the area of 
excavation. Mining also prevents other commercial use—like ranching of the 
lands occupied—at least unless and until successful reclamation occurs dec-
ades in the future. These conflicts, what might be called absolute use conflicts, 
would appear to present public land managers with a binary option set. For 
example, they can allow mining to the detriment of wildlife or foreclose min-
ing to the detriment of the enterprise seeking access to minerals. Absolute use 
conflicts like this one transcend the divide between traditional, resource inter-
ests and environmental and recreational interests, because activities that are 
themselves viewed as environmentally desirable may simultaneously degrade 
the land. For example, large-scale solar power facilities may advance climate 
policy but disturb desert ecosystems, including habitat for threatened desert 
tortoise, and heat from them can kill the unfortunate bird or bat that passes 
overhead.16 
The appearance that absolute conflicts can only be resolved by authoriz-
ing or denying permission for a particular use is, however, an illusion, at least 
sometimes. Such an illusion results from an atomistic view of public lands and 
narrow thinking about the array of possibilities available to land managers. 
Ecosystems function as landscapes, not as individual tracts in isolation, and it 
may be possible to offset harm in one place by improving another. In the par-
lance of environmental law, such offsets are called compensatory mitigation, 
and in a fashion that can fairly be described as both inconsistent and ad hoc, 
public land managers have relied upon this mechanism to both allow intensive 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable Energy 
Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293, 297–98 (2014); REBECCA A. KAGAN ET AL., AVIAN 
MORTALITY AT SOLAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1–2 (2014), https://alternativeenergy.procon.org/sourcefiles/avian-mortality-solar-energy-ivanpah-apr-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC3C-P92A] (reporting data on mortality caused by solar projects). 
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land use and ensure overall ecological vibrancy.17 For example, an oil compa-
ny seeking to drill within the migration route of Wyoming’s pronghorn ante-
lope could be required to build a wildlife overpass across a nearby road or re-
move or replace fencing that impedes passage.18 Doing so would at least par-
tially compensate for the harm of drilling. 
Compensatory mitigation is not, however, a panacea for the problems that 
dog public land management. Some harms cannot be rectified. Purporting to 
compensate for them will be ineffective at best and a grievous insult to those 
whose interests are impaired at worst. Imagine the BLM approving construc-
tion of a wind farm in the Badger-Two Medicine area of Montana, which is pro-
foundly sacred to the Blackfeet Nation.19 Restoring other public lands would not 
assuage the grievous injury experienced by the Tribe. A deficit in scientific un-
derstanding or technical capacity may impair or entirely thwart other efforts.20 
Compensatory mitigation that lies beyond current technical knowledge will fail, 
engendering cynicism among the business community and the public. 
Compensatory mitigation has featured prominently in other environmen-
tal contexts, serving as the cornerstone of Clean Water Act permits for filling 
wetlands and other waters and Endangered Species Act incidental take per-
mits.21 Although not without their failures, these programs arose from a need 
for innovation, regulatory flexibility, and compromise.22 They have spawned a 
vibrant and growing community of companies that implement mitigation pro-
                                                                                                                           
 17 The BLM’s 1988 plan for conserving desert tortoise represents an example of the agency adopting 
a “no net loss” standard to govern compensatory mitigation for activities within the habitat of an unlisted 
species. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DESERT TORTOISE MGMT. OVERSIGHT GRP., FINAL REPORT: 
COMPENSATION FOR THE DESERT TORTOISE 1 (1991), https://tortoise.org/conservation/hastey1991.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GJ7E-F4JT] (describing need for compensatory mitigation to implement no net loss 
policy of 1988 Desert Tortoise Habitat Management plan); see also Instruction Memorandum No. 
AZ-2012-031 from State Director to District Managers & Field Managers (June 14, 2012), https://
www.blm.gov/policy/im-az-2012-031 [https://perma.cc/CF67-JDYZ]. 
 18 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bergen v. Lawrence, 620 F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D. Wyo. 1985) 
(ordering a rancher to replace fencing that prevents passage of pronghorn antelope). 
 19 See Jesse DesRosier, Opinion, Safeguard Badger Two Medicine Land, GREAT FALLS TRIB., 
Aug. 25, 2015, at A4. DesRosier is a member of the Blackfeet Nation, a Native American tribe that 
has fought to prevent oil companies from drilling in the Badger-Two Medicine area. Id.  
 20 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 7 (2001) (noting difficulty of creating fens and bogs). 
 21 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2018) (authorizing incidental take permits); 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018) 
(authorizing permits for dredged and fill material). 
 22 See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation 
Within the Terms of the Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 355, 366 (1994); Dave Owen, The Conservative Turn 
Against Compensatory Mitigation, 48 ENVTL. L. 265, 269 (2018) (“Compensatory mitigation emerged 
because it has the potential to address real needs.”). For a framework to evaluate the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of environmental markets, see generally Michael Pappas & Victor B. Flatt, The 
Costs of Creating Environmental Markets: A Commodification Primer, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 731 
(2019). 
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jects to generate credits for sale, resulting in the attendant benefits and detri-
ments of harnessing the marketplace to address environmental problems.23 The 
BLM has lagged in developing an effective, consistent, and predictable com-
pensatory mitigation program, but addressing use conflicts on public lands pre-
sents similar needs and demands a similar spirit of innovation. 
During the Obama Administration, the BLM set itself to this task, draw-
ing on lessons from other agencies. The Department of the Interior adopted a 
landscape mitigation policy, orienting the BLM and other components toward 
considering ecosystems, rather than individual projects on a case-by-case ba-
sis.24 The BLM incorporated compensatory mitigation as a component of its 
Desert Renewables Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) to guide development 
of alternative energy resources in the California desert.25 And the BLM and the 
U.S. Forest Service relied upon compensatory mitigation as a key component 
of conservation plans for the greater sage-grouse, which were instrumental to 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service deciding not to initiate a listing under the 
Endangered Species Act.26 The greater sage-grouse conservation plans, in turn, 
led states and private companies to develop innovative mechanisms to create 
economic certainty for the business community and ecological certainty for the 
bird.27 
The Trump Administration has taken a radically different approach. Former 
Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke called compensatory mitigation “un-American,” 
describing it as an act of “extortion.”28 In July 2018, the BLM issued an “In-
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. 
REV. 1091, 1118–25 (2013) (discussing concerns about privatized mitigation); Elan L. Spanjer, Note, 
Swamp Money: The Opportunity and Uncertainty of Investing in Wetland Mitigation Banking, 113 
NW. U. L. REV. 371, 382–87 (2018) (discussing rise of for-profit wetlands mitigation banks). 
 24 See Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 3330 (Oct. 31, 2013) 
[hereinafter Secretarial Order No. 3330]. 
 25 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSERVATION PLAN RECORD 
OF DECISION 6–7 (2016) [hereinafter DRECP ROD], https://energyarchive.ca.gov/drecp/finaldrecp/
rod/DRECP_BLM_LUPA_ROD.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB8D-3C3V]. 
 26 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List 
Greater Sage-Grouse (Centrocercus urophasianus) as an Endangered or Threatened Species, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 59,858, 59,858 (Dep’t of the Interior Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Greater Sage-Grouse Finding] 
(notice of finding); U.S. FOREST SERV., MYTHS V. FACTS: GREATER SAGE-GROUSE CONSERVATION 
STRATEGY 1 (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprd3855690.
pdf [https://perma.cc/838B-W6Z5]. 
 27 See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Public-Private Conservation Agreements and the Greater Sage-
Grouse, 39 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 165, 186–88 (2018). 
 28 See Jennifer Yachnin, Zinke Vows to Restore ‘Breaches,’ Keep NPS Despite Reorg, E&E 
NEWS PM (June 27, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060056675 [https://perma.
cc/7SHW-C2U8]. For an analysis of another Trump Administration initiative to limit settlements 
incorporating payments for projects designed to offset harms caused by environmental violations, see 
Seema M. Kakade, Remedial Payments in Agency Enforcement, 44 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3361746 [https://perma.cc/2L7D-NBCR].  
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struction Memorandum”—a policy document for BLM staff—that categorically 
forbids the use of compensatory mitigation.29 This policy parrots the view of 
Secretary Zinke and tersely proclaims that the BLM lacks statutory authority 
under FLPMA to impose compensatory mitigation even though the agency has 
been doing so for decades.30 BLM has persisted in this policy under the leader-
ship of Secretary David Bernhardt.31 Put differently, this new policy asserts that 
the BLM can’t require compensatory mitigation, not that it shouldn’t. 
This change in course reflects a broader reorientation in environmental 
law. The Trump Administration has distanced itself from the economic princi-
ples that have historically underlaid conservative critiques of environmental 
protection and accompanying calls for the use of cost-benefit analysis to ani-
mate federal policymaking.32 Instead, the focus has shifted solely to the cost 
side of the equation, divorced from any assessment of benefits.33 When regula-
tions cost too much, they are cast as burdens on economic activities, irrespec-
tive of the benefits they produce.34 Through that lens, compensatory mitigation 
is just another regulatory burden for the chopping block, rather than a market 
corrective resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources. 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Instruction Memorandum from Deputy Dir. for Policy & Programs, Bureau of Land Mgmt., to 
Assistant Dirs. & All Field Office Officials, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (July 24, 2018) [hereinafter July 
2018 Instruction Memorandum], http://sagebrusheco.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/sagebrusheconvgov/content/
Meetings/2018/IM2018-093%20Compensatory%20Mitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG4W-ZPBC]. 
See generally Justin R. Pidot, The Bureau of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation 
Policy, 30 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2018). The BLM reissued a slightly modified version of the 
instruction memorandum on December 6, 2018. Memorandum from Deputy Dir. for Policy & Pro-
grams, Bureau of Land Mgmt., to Assistant Dirs. et al., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Dec. 6, 2018) [herein-
after Dec. 2018 Modified Memorandum], https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2019-018 [https://perma.cc/
9PLX-VSLB]. 
 30 See Pidot, supra note 29, at 2. 
 31 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., OREGON GREATER SAGE-GROUSE: RECORD OF DECISION 
AND APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT 1-4 (2019), https://eplanning.blm.gov/
epl-front-office/projects/lup/103348/168708/205327/2019_Oregon_GRSG_ROD_ARMPA.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J8PM-B8BF] (amending land use plan due to “BLM’s determination that [FLPMA] . . . does 
not explicitly mandate or authorize the BLM to require public land users to implement compensatory 
mitigation as a condition of obtaining authorization for the use of BLM-administered lands”). 
 32 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environ-
mental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 75, 93 (2001) (describing the conservative push to replace “environmental standards 
based on minimum standards of human health and technology-forcing requirements . . . [with] envi-
ronmental standards based on cost/benefit analyses, comparative risk assessment, and other economic 
efficiency criteria”). 
 33 See Richard L. Revesz, Congress and the Executive: Challenging the Anti-Regulatory Narra-
tive, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 795, 818. 
 34 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL REPORT: REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR ACTIONS THAT POTENTIALLY BURDEN DOMESTIC ENERGY 8 (2017) [hereinafter DOI 
ACTIONS], https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/interior_energy_actions_report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SPL3-N5JS] (describing BLM rule regulating venting and flaring of natural gas on 
public lands that “poses a substantial burden on industry” without evaluating benefits produced). 
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Put differently, historic contestation over environmental protection largely 
addressed instrument selection—how should we protect the environment—
rather than the ultimate goal—whether we should protect the environment. 
Political leaders across the ideological landscape embraced goals of clean air, 
healthy watersheds, vibrant ecosystems, and the preservation of imperiled spe-
cies.35 After all, wetlands preservation served as a cornerstone of President 
George H.W. Bush’s campaign for president in 1988, which led to the estab-
lishment of the federal policy of “no-net loss” of wetlands, adherence to which 
was expressed by every subsequent administration prior to the Trump Admin-
istration.36 
The American people continue to broadly support environmental protec-
tion: a 2017 poll found that nearly three-quarters of adults believe that “the 
country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment,” including fif-
ty-two percent of Republicans.37 But politics in Washington, D.C. have 
changed. This Article responds to the current political landscape through a 
deep examination of FLPMA. It explains why, contrary to the BLM’s current 
view, the statute provides ample authority to require compensatory mitigation. 
It also explains why this tool for public land management should not be aban-
doned, despite its limitations. 
Recognizing the authority provided by FLPMA is important because 
FLPMA establishes the framework for the management of more federal prop-
erty than any other statute, and public lands serve as the linchpin for many 
conservation efforts in the western United States.38 Other laws may authorize 
compensatory mitigation when connected to specific land uses, for example 
the development of leasable minerals under the Mineral Leasing Act.39 But as 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,328, 10,336 (2017) (“When the U.S. Congress passed the major pollution-control laws in the 
1970s, it was responding to a growing consensus that federal environmental regulations were essential 
to protection of human health and the environment.”). 
 36 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Base-
lines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2011) (describing the adoption of “no net 
loss” as a component of George H.W. Bush’s campaign and adherence to that principle in subsequent 
administrations through the Obama Administration). Although the Trump Administration has not 
formally repudiated the no-net-loss goal, its proposal to redefine the scope of Clean Water Act Juris-
diction—referred to as the “Waters of the United States” rule—would place significant constraints on 
the ability of federal agencies to protect wetlands. See Coral Davenport, Trump Prepares to Unveil a 
Vast Reworking of Clean Water Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/10/climate/trump-clean-water-rollback.html [https://perma.cc/2TQB-ZUUL]. 
 37 Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental Issues, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/20/for-earth-day-heres-
how-americans-view-environmental-issues/ [https://perma.cc/TTG9-QSPY]. 
 38 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 8. 
 39 See 30 U.S.C. § 226(g) (2018) (authorizing regulation of surface-disturbing activities); Boesche 
v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1963) (explaining that the Mineral Leasing Act delegates “broad 
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the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources ex-
plained, under FLPMA, “[f]or the first time in the long history of the public 
lands, one law provides comprehensive authority and guidelines for the admin-
istration and protection of the Federal lands and their resources.”40 By exercis-
ing this cross-cutting authority, the BLM can develop and implement con-
sistent, integrated compensatory mitigation to account for all of the uses within 
a landscape. 
Evaluating FLPMA is also important because the law resembles other le-
gal frameworks that do, or could, include compensatory mitigation. The Na-
tional Forest Management Act, which governs national forests, shares many of 
FLPMA’s features, and the logic of the argument offered in this Article can 
easily extend to the U.S. Forest Service.41 Although the structures of more tra-
ditional environmental laws like the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species 
Act considerably diverge, those laws generally include no greater express au-
thorization for compensatory mitigation.42 Put differently, if FLPMA doesn’t 
authorize compensatory mitigation, it’s not clear why the instrument would be 
permissible under those laws. 
To accomplish these tasks, this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I de-
scribes compensatory mitigation, identifying its antecedents from other legal 
contexts, and its shifting role in public land management.43 Part II describes 
the evolution of public land law, because understanding FLPMA’s place in that 
history provides important analytic guideposts.44 Part II also describes three 
primary mandates imposed by FLPMA to guide public land management: the 
Land Use Planning Mandate, the Multiple Use Mandate, and the Anti-
Degradation Mandate.45 Part III catalogues the array of land management deci-
                                                                                                                           
authority” to issue “rules and regulations governing in minute detail all facets of the working of the 
land”). Federal agencies must also evaluate mitigation measures as a component of the environmental 
review process established by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1502.14(f) (2019). Nonetheless, courts have construed NEPA to impose purely procedural, rather 
than substantive, requirements. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
349–51 (1989) (raising questions about whether NEPA could constitute an affirmative source of au-
thority to require compensatory mitigation). 
 40 S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FED-
ERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at vi (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA] (providing the cover memorandum prepared by Senator Henry M. Jack-
son). 
41 Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
42 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2018). 
 43 See infra notes 52–132 and accompanying text.  
 44 See infra notes 133–222 and accompanying text. 
 45 The Anti-Degradation Mandate does not, as will be discussed, prohibit all environmental deg-
radation, but rather only “unnecessary and undue degradation.” See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2018). This 
is sometimes referred to as “UUD.” See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
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sions made by the BLM and explains how FLPMA’s trio of mandates authoriz-
es the use of compensatory mitigation across a range of decisions.46 This Part 
then argues that the BLM should not receive deference for its current, contrary 
view disclaiming authority. Having demonstrated that compensatory mitigation 
is a lawful component of the land manager’s portfolio, Part IV describes its 
potential benefits and identifies considerations that should guide assessment of 
whether and how to use it.47 
Others have noted the falling political fortunes of compensatory mitiga-
tion, leading Professor Dave Owen to worry that having lost support among 
conservatives and liberals alike, it “may now occupy a position analogous to a 
politician whose coalition is just a little too small.”48 Yet, public lands have 
often fostered consensus, even in divisive times. Even now. Soon after the 
longest government shutdown in American history,49 with Congress and the 
President embroiled in a vicious battle over border security,50 the Senate voted 
ninety-two to eight in favor of “the most sweeping conservation legislation in a 
decade” to protect millions of acres of public lands.51 
Compensatory mitigation offers an opportunity to bridge ideological di-
vides and find practical, meaningful solutions to pressing problems on public 
lands. The BLM has the legal authority to deploy this technique. It should not 
neglect the chance to forge consensus, develop natural resources, and ensure 
that future generations inherit healthy and productive public lands. 
I. COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN CONTEXT 
Compensatory mitigation has become an integral component of environ-
mental law, but the concept did not originate there. Its antecedents in common 
law and land use planning inform its potential, its limitations, and how it nests 
within statutory schemes, like FLPMA, where agencies have deployed it. This 
Part illustrates that history and the rise of compensatory mitigation in envi-
ronmental law more generally. It closes with a discussion of the shifting views 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See infra notes 223–318 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 319–391 and accompanying text. 
 48 Owen, supra note 22, at 268. 
 49 Julie Bosman, How the Shutdown Reordered American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/us/government-shutdown-over.html [https://perma.cc/85NA-
DGG6]. 
 50 Emily Cochrane & Catie Edmondson, Trump, Inching Toward Border Security Deal, Says 
Shutdown Would Be ‘Terrible,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/
politics/government-shutdown-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/7EUF-PGED]. 
 51 Juliet Eilperin & Dino Grandoni, The Senate Just Passed the Decade’s Biggest Public Lands 
Package. Here’s What’s in It., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2019/02/12/senate-just-passed-decades-biggest-public-lands-package-heres-whats-it 
[https://perma.cc/5LDB-NY4C]. 
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of compensatory mitigation on public lands and how they fit within a broader 
sea-change in the American political landscape. 
A. Locating Mitigation as a Doctrine to Offset Harm 
The concept of mitigation predates its deployment as a tool to ameliorate 
environmental harm. Most future lawyers encounter it in required first-year 
courses, including contracts, and most relevant to public lands, property. In 
those fields, mitigation—and in general the term is used without a qualifier—
has differing but related meanings due to the various interests at stake and 
roles of government institutions. In each, however, mitigation relates to acts 
that reduce “how harmful, unpleasant, or seriously bad a situation is.”52 
In contracts law, the mitigation doctrine identifies circumstances in which 
parties must engage in “self-help” to reduce the damage they suffer from a 
counter-party’s breach.53 More generally, courts recognize that the damages 
otherwise owed to a plaintiff should be reduced where mitigation measures 
have offset the damage done, on the theory that civil remedies are generally 
compensatory in nature.54 This common law concept closely resembles com-
pensatory mitigation in environmental law because it presumes that harm oc-
curs and obliges parties to take steps to offset it. 
In property law, students learn about mitigation in a context even more 
closely analogous to environmental mitigation, although using the terminology 
of exactions rather than mitigation. Since the turn of the twentieth century, land 
use planning has served to define the private rights attendant to the ownership 
of real property. In its earliest manifestations, comprehensive zoning codes 
were prohibitory in nature, designating the land uses permitted within the geo-
graphical zones of a jurisdiction. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its 
1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, increasing population densi-
ty had created new, novel problems “which require, and will continue to require, 
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands.”55 
Municipalities soon developed additional land use planning tools that did 
more than simply prohibit or limit land uses. A second generation of controls 
                                                                                                                           
 52 Mitigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 53 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1932); see also Charles 
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obli-
gation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967 (1983) (“The duty to mitigate is a universally accepted principle of 
contract law requiring that each party exert reasonable efforts to minimize losses whenever interven-
ing events impede contractual objectives.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Note, The Mitigating Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs, 63 HARV. L. 
REV. 330, 337 (1949) (“In general, however, it would seem reasonable that a compensatory theory of 
damages be adhered to as far as possible; this requires mitigation of the damages recoverable by the 
injured party from the wrongdoer.”). 
 55 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). 
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recognized that “many proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on the pub-
lic that dedications of property can offset,”56 and zoning boards and other land 
use agencies began to condition land use approvals upon a property owner 
agreeing to engage in activities to offset those costs.57 These so-called exac-
tions are equivalent to compensatory mitigation: they do not seek to modify a 
development proposal to avoid or minimize impacts, but rather, they require 
developers to compensate for impacts. 
Exactions first appeared as rules governing subdivisions to secure infra-
structure, such as adequate streets and sewers, to service the subdivided lots 
without taxpayers footing the bill.58 Subdivision exactions were included in 
model zoning enabling legislation issued by the U.S. Department of Com-
merce in 1928.59 By the mid-1960s, the use of exactions had broadened to ad-
dress the pressure a subdivision places upon social services like education and 
open space.60 
The Supreme Court considered whether exactions violate private property 
rights in a series of cases that represent the Court’s closest brush with compen-
satory mitigation. In 1987 in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and in 
1994 in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court considered exactions that required 
property owners to convey interests in land to the government in exchange for 
development authorization.61 Read together, the Court approved such measures 
so long as there exists a “‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 605 (2013). 
 57 Exactions could be somewhat broader than compensatory mitigation because they could im-
pose obligations disconnected from the harm threatened by the regulatory permission to which they 
attach. Such exactions would not mitigate harms. The Supreme Court has substantially limited, and 
perhaps altogether prohibited, that practice. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606. 
 58 See, e.g., Allen v. Stockwell, 178 N.W. 27, 28, 29–30 (Mich. 1920) (reciting exaction provi-
sions of subdivision ordinance and holding that requiring a property owner to install improvements 
was valid exercise of the police power). Although some infrastructure exactions required property 
owners to construct improvements on their own property, even in the early days they were not always 
geographically limited. See, e.g., John W. Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning 
Boards, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 267 (1955) (describing a 1937 New York law requiring that “before a 
building permit may be issued, the street or highway providing access to the building must ‘have been 
suitably improved . . . as adequate in respect to the public health, safety and general welfare for the 
special circumstances of the particular street or highway’” (quoting N.Y. TOWN LAW § 260-a)). 
 59 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT 27 (1928) 
(“Such [subdivision] regulations may include provisions as to the extent to which streets and other 
ways shall be graded and improved and to which water and sewer and other utility mains, piping, or 
other facilities shall be installed as a condition precedent to the approval of the [subdivision] plat.”). 
 60 See Ira Michael Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased 
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 
1134 (1964) (“Typical of the newer kinds of demanded exactions are land dedications for school and 
park sites and fees to be used for the acquisition and improvement of such sites.”). 
 61 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
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ernment’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”62 In other words, 
the government can demand a dedication of property to mitigate the harms 
caused by a developer’s activities, so long as the property actually served to 
offset attendant harms. In 2013, in Koontz v. St. Johns River Management Dis-
trict, the Court extended this framework to include exactions requiring pay-
ment of money to the government, rather than the conveyance of real proper-
ty.63 Where the government’s demand for land or funds does not relate to the 
impacts threatened by proposed development, the Court explained that an ex-
action “is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion.’”64 Where, however, a sufficient connection exists, the Court has simply 
“insist[ed] that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their con-
duct,” which is “a hallmark of responsible land-use policy.”65 Put differently, 
so long as exactions constitute compensatory mitigation, the Supreme Court 
has countenanced their use. 
B. Developing Principles of Environmental Mitigation 
Federal agencies lagged behind local land use planners in adopting miti-
gation policies but began to do so in the late 1970s. Environmental mitigation 
recognizes that humans do not act in isolation: our activities often have costs 
that we do not directly bear. A landowner who seeks a permit to fill wetlands 
on her property to create fast land upon which to build a mall may increase the 
risk of flooding elsewhere in the watershed.66 A company that seeks authoriza-
tion to drill an oil well in sage-grouse country can destroy native plant species 
providing forage for mule deer.67 An energy company that plans to build hun-
                                                                                                                           
 62 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599 (describing Nollan and Dolan); see Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expendi-
tures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 142–47 (2014) (discussing the evolution of the 
exactions doctrine). The nexus and proportionality test applies only to land use exactions and not 
regulations that simply restrict property uses. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 153 (2018). 
 63 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 612. It remains unsettled, however, whether every permit condition is sub-
ject to this limitation, such as permit conditions that require an owner to expend funds to satisfy an 
affirmative obligation, but do not involve a transfer of money or other property to the government. See 
Pidot, supra note 62, at 135–36. It is also unknown whether those imposed through legislation rather 
than through permitting are subject to this limitation. See John D. Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 
VT. L. REV. 573, 610–12 (2015). 
 64 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–15 
(N.H. 1981)). The Supreme Court’s use of the word “extortion” in Nollan to describe exactions un-
connected to the harms threatened by development may be the source that inspired Secretary Zinke’s 
description of compensatory mitigation in the same terms. See Pidot, supra note 29, at 12–13. 
 65 Koontz, 570 U.S. at 605.  
 66 See Bersani v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding denial of 
wetlands fill permit to property owner intending to build a mall); Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disas-
ter, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 250 (discussing externalities from watershed development). 
 67 Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 661 F.3d at 75. 
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dreds of wind turbines along the Appalachian Trail can destroy the feeling of 
naturalness experienced by those who traverse its length.68 If these activities 
occur, the harms to wildlife, watersheds, and naturalness will impair public 
values and will constitute economic externalities, because they are not borne 
by the hardware store owner, the oil driller, or the wind farmer.69 Environmen-
tal mitigation offers a potential corrective, both to the economic inefficiency 
resulting from externalities and to environmental harm. 
Unlike mitigation in other contexts, environmental mitigation has been 
defined to include activities broader than those solely designed to offset im-
pacts. Federal agencies, including the Council of Environmental Quality and 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, define mitigation to encompass a spectrum 
of measures to avoid, minimize, and compensate for impacts—described as a 
mitigation hierarchy.70 The hierarchy exists because mitigation policies gener-
ally direct that impacts should be avoided, then minimized, and those that re-
main should be compensated.71 Environmental mitigation, therefore, departs 
from the traditional usage of the term, that is confined to offsetting harm, ra-
ther than avoiding or minimizing it. 
The broader meaning of mitigation in the environmental context and the 
mitigation hierarchy have begun to take root in other disciplines outside of the 
environmental context. The World Bank, for instance, uses the mitigation hier-
archy to identify measures to address both the environmental and social im-
pacts resulting from the projects it funds,72 and the mitigation hierarchy was 
included in a 2010 report designed to facilitate corporate social responsibility 
in the human rights context.73 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See NEW ENGLAND CONSERVATION CMTY., PERSPECTIVES ON WIND POWER: DEFINING 
COMMON PRINCIPLES ON WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROTECTION OF NEW ENGLAND’S 
NATURAL HERITAGE 1 (Jan. 2006), https://www.outdoors.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/cons-wind-
power-wpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRW6-85VD]. 
 69 See Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal 
Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2018) (explaining that environmental externalities 
“are not accounted for when leasing” fossil fuel resources on public lands, which “results in fossil fuel 
production on public lands imposing significant social costs”). 
 70 10 C.F.R. § 900.3 (2019) (identifying “mitigation hierarchy” as “first seeking to avoid, then 
minimize impacts, then, when necessary, compensate for residual impacts”); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 
(2019) (defining “mitigation”). The Council of Environmental Quality’s regulations identify five 
(rather than three) components of mitigation: measures that avoid, minimize, rectify, reduce, and 
compensate for environmental impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20. 
 71 10 C.F.R. § 900.3. 
 72 See WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 26–27 (2017); see also Wells 
Fargo & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 6616862, at *35 (Mar. 6, 2018) (establishing a per-
formance standard to “avoid, minimize, and where residual impacts remain, to compensate/offset for 
risks and impacts to workers, Affected Communities, and the environment”). 
 73 See DÉSIRÉE ABRAHAMS & YANN WYSS, INT’L BUS. LEADERS FORUM & INT’L FIN. CORP., 
GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (HRIAM) 49 (2010) (identify-
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Two programs have taken a leading role in developing environmental mit-
igation—wetlands mitigation under the Clean Water Act and habitat mitigation 
under the Endangered Species Act.74 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in 
coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency, developed the wet-
lands mitigation program after President George H.W. Bush adopted a policy 
of no-net loss of wetlands.75 The phrase “no-net loss” implies tradeoffs be-
tween wetlands across geography, and pursuing that goal would either require 
a freeze in the filling of wetlands or the development of a robust mechanism 
for compensatory mitigation. 
The Corps has rarely exercised its authority to deny fill permits, and in-
stead pursued wetlands mitigation aggressively.76 For almost two decades, wet-
lands mitigation occurred through a “mish-mash of guidances, inter-agency 
memoranda, and other policy documents.”77 In 2008, the Corps replaced that 
assemblage with comprehensive regulations. The regulations define compensa-
tory mitigation to include efforts to restore, create, enhance, or even sometimes 
preserve aquatic resources to offset the impacts a permitted activity will have 
to biological, environmental, and hydrological systems.78 They further provide 
that a permittee may mitigate by undertaking a project directly or by acquiring 
mitigation credits from for-profit and non-profit mitigation banks and other 
programs administered by government and non-profit entities.79 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service adopted its first formal mitigation pol-
icy in 1981.80 The program became a significant component of the Service’s 
work during the Clinton Administration, when under the leadership of Secre-
                                                                                                                           
ing measures to avoid, reduce, restore, and compensate); see also Radu Mares, Human Rights Due 
Diligence and the Root Causes of Harm in Business Operation: A Textual and Contextual Analysis of 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 1, 59–60 (2018) (discussing 
mitigation hierarchy and the HRIAM guide). 
 74 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2018). 
 75 See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 36, at 2–4. 
 76 See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 650–57 (2000) (describing the development of wetlands mitigation banking). 
 77 J.B. Ruhl et al., Implementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section 404 Com-
pensatory Mitigation Program—A Catalyst for Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 
251, 252 (2009). 
 78 33 C.F.R. § 322.2 (2019); 40 C.F.R. § 230.92 (2019); see, e.g., S. PAC. DIV., U.S. ARMY 
CORPS OF ENG’RS, FINAL 2015 REGIONAL COMPENSATORY MITIGATION AND MONITORING GUIDE-
LINES 14 (2015), https://www.spd.usace.army.mil/Portals/13/docs/regulatory/mitigation/MitMon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HS6X-D955] (“According to the Mitigation Rule . . . consideration of aquatic re-
source function and service objectives is important given that different landscape positions and land-
scape stressors influence fulfillment of various functions and of hydrology, water quality, and habitat 
functions in the context of compensatory mitigation.”). 
 79 S. PAC. DIV., supra note 78, at 48. The regulations differentiate between acquiring credits from 
a mitigation bank and an in-lieu fee program, each of which is subject to different governing rules. Id. 
 80 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy; Notice of Final Policy, 46 Fed. Reg. 7644, 
7648 (Dep’t of the Interior Jan. 23, 1981).  
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tary Bruce Babbitt, it sought to inject greater flexibility and predictability into 
the Endangered Species Act.81 Two initiatives resulted: (1) the development of 
Candidate Conservation Agreements, whereby property owners could agree to 
take conservation actions for an unlisted species to secure predictable obliga-
tions should the species be listed;82 (2) significant expansion of the use of 
habitat conservation plans to enable private parties to secure authorization for 
the incidental take of listed species.83 Compensatory mitigation lay at the heart 
of both of these programs because they rested on the premise that impacts to 
species at one location could be offset elsewhere.84 
The boundaries for avoidance, minimization, and compensation are not, 
however, always as crisp, particularly in the context of public land manage-
ment. Wetlands mitigation and habitat mitigation seek to protect a single re-
source. When an acre of wetlands is destroyed or degraded, activities taken 
elsewhere to offset the impact comfortably fit within the definition of compen-
satory mitigation. This analysis changes when multiple resources come into 
play. Imagine that an oil drilling operation will occur in an area rich with na-
tive plants that provides forage for mule deer. If the driller is required to culti-
vate new native plants to offset those destroyed by its operation, this might at 
first appear to constitute compensatory mitigation: a gain of native plants is 
compensating for a loss elsewhere. Public land management is not limited, 
however, to conserving plant species.85 If the newly restored habitat provides 
forage for the very animals who grazed where the oil well now stands, this 
measure could also be described as minimizing impacts to the mule deer herd. 
Framing the nature of the threatened harm and the mechanism by which a 
measure ameliorates that harm can, therefore, lead to differing conclusions 
about whether a measure avoids, minimizes, or compensates for harm. This 
categorization problem need not impede management decisions, however, so 
long as public land managers have authority to require all forms of mitigation. 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Babbitt, supra note 22, at 366; J.B. Ruhl, Past, Present, and Future Trends of the Endan-
gered Species Act, 25 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 15, 33–34 (2004). 
 82 Announcement for Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 
Fed. Reg. 32,726, 32,726 (Dep’t of the Interior June 17, 1999).  
 83 Habitat Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8859 (Feb. 23, 1998) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 222); see Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a 
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 308 (2007) (explaining that habitat con-
servation plans “flourished during the Clinton Administration and continue to proliferate”). 
 84 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 76, at 648 (explaining that Service has “leveraged [HCPs] as a 
way of allowing development that degrades endangered species habitat by preserving or enhancing 
endangered species habitat elsewhere”). 
 85 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018) (defining multiple-use management). 
1062 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1045 
C. Changing Tides of Compensatory Mitigation on Public Lands 
The BLM has relied upon compensatory mitigation as a component of 
public land management for many decades, but in an often atomistic and ad 
hoc fashion, dependent on the preferences of local land managers and their 
views of the particular land uses they authorize.86 The agency incorporated 
compensatory mitigation into decisions authorizing projects at least sixteen 
times between 1980 and 2000 and dozens more between 2000 and 2008.87 For 
many years, the practice received little attention—perhaps because these deci-
sions addressed specific projects, rather than constituting national policy direc-
tives—although a state BLM office barred compensatory mitigation require-
ments for public lands in Wyoming for a few years in the 1990s.88 The most 
recent presidential administrations set new courses, displacing local decisions 
with national directives. This Section describes efforts in the Obama Admin-
istration to standardize compensatory mitigation and incorporate it into land 
use planning, and in the Trump Administration to disavow the tool altogether. 
When the Obama Administration took power, the BLM had issued only 
one nationwide policy that addressed compensatory mitigation in one context. 
In 2000, the BLM issued regulations to ensure that hard rock mining did not 
cause “undue or unnecessary degradation of the land” as required by FLP-
MA.89 During the rulemaking process, some commenters argued that the BLM 
lacked authority to require miners to engage in compensatory mitigation. The 
BLM disagreed, explaining that “[m]itigation measures fall squarely within the 
actions the Secretary can direct to prevent undue or unnecessary degradation of 
the public lands. An impact that can be mitigated, but is not, is unnecessary.”90 
The rule requires compensatory mitigation where it could occur at a project 
site, and permitted, but does not require, off-site compensatory mitigation.91 
Although not entirely precise, the BLM described on-site mitigation as involv-
ing measures occurring “on the public lands within the area of mining opera-
tions.”92 The BLM did not explain why mitigation would always be required if 
it could be performed “within the area,” but would be required on a case-by-
                                                                                                                           
 86 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Memorandum from Michael D. Nedd, Acting Director of the Bureau of Land Mgmt., Re: 
BLM Authorized Projects with Compensatory Mitigation, at Attachment 1 (Aug. 25, 2017) (on file 
with author). The BLM identifies 52 approvals that included compensatory mitigation between 2000 
and 2008, most of which address impacts to wildlife habitat and cultural resources. Id. 
 88 See Pidot, supra note 29, at 9. 
 89 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 90 Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 
70,012 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 2090, et al). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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case basis if located further afield.93 Nor did the regulations provide further 
definition of when, where, or how compensatory mitigation would be required, 
leaving such decisions to field managers tasked with reviewing and approving 
mining plans. 
The Obama Administration effort to reform and standardize compensato-
ry mitigation started at the top. In May 2013, President Barack Obama issued a 
memorandum addressing infrastructure projects including roads, transmission 
lines, navigation channels, pipelines, and renewable and conventional energy 
generation.94 The Obama Infrastructure Memorandum explains that “[r]eliable, 
safe, and resilient infrastructure is the backbone of an economy built to last.”95 
These important public priorities are not, however, elevated above all others. 
Rather, echoing principles of multiple use management, the memorandum ex-
plains that “in taking steps to improve our infrastructure, we must remember 
that the protection and continued enjoyment of our Nation’s environmental, 
historic, and cultural resources remain an equally important driver of economic 
opportunity, resiliency and quality of life.”96 The Memorandum then advocates 
for the use of an array of policies and practices to shape the balance struck 
among these competing demands for public lands, including “landscape- and 
watershed-level mitigation practices.”97 
In 2015, the President issued a second memorandum, this time specifical-
ly addressing mitigation practices across the federal government.98 Once again, 
the memorandum invokes themes of balancing current development needs with 
conserving resources for future generations, proclaiming that “[w]e all have a 
moral obligation to the next generation to leave America’s natural resources in 
better condition than when we inherited them.”99 Mitigation in general, and 
compensatory mitigation in particular, is identified as a vital tool to “achieve 
strong environmental outcomes while encouraging development and providing 
services to the American people.”100 The Obama Mitigation Memorandum rec-
ognizes that compensatory mitigation may impose costs on business interests, 
but asserts that these costs could be minimized by ensuring that mitigation pol-
icies are clear and consistent across federal agencies. Consistency would in-
crease business certainty, allowing resource users to better plan and obtain fi-
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 94 Memorandum on Modernizing Federal Infrastructure Review and Permitting Regulations, 
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nancing for their activities.101 It would also enhance fairness by creating a level 
playing field so that some businesses were not placed at a competitive disad-
vantage through the imposition of ad hoc requirements that could increase their 
costs as compared to other businesses that received more favorable terms.102 
Activity at the Department of the Interior reflected the White House’s at-
tention to compensatory mitigation. Secretary Sally Jewell convened a work-
ing group to review mitigation policies Department-wide and to recommend 
revisions to enhance consistency and focus mitigation on landscapes and eco-
systems, rather than on individual project sites.103 The taskforce issued a report 
articulating a set of general principles,104 which were then embedded in a new 
section of the Departmental Manual—a document that establishes policies for 
all Interior components—that established a “Landscape-Scale Mitigation Poli-
cy.”105 In turn, the BLM implemented that directive in a mitigation policy of its 
own.106 At the BLM’s request, the Department Solicitor also issued a legal 
opinion (M-37039) analyzing the authority FLPMA provides to require com-
pensatory mitigation, which concludes that “the BLM generally has the author-
ity and discretion to identify and require appropriate mitigation when authoriz-
ing uses of the public lands.”107 
In 2016, the BLM amended its land use planning regulations to include 
objectives to “[i]dentify standards to mitigate undesirable impacts to resource 
conditions,” including through compensatory mitigation.108 It also incorporated 
compensatory mitigation requirements into specific land use plans and project 
level decisions in two high-visibility contexts: greater sage-grouse conserva-
tion and energy infrastructure development. Landscape-scale compensatory 
mitigation became the cornerstone of the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service 
greater sage-grouse conservation plans, which were subsequently implemented 
by amending more than ninety land use plans for public lands and national for-
ests and which forestalled listing the species under the Endangered Species 
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Act.109 Under the amended land use plans, resource users must implement 
compensatory mitigation as a condition of engaging in surface-disturbing ac-
tivities within sixty seven million acres of federal lands.110 The adoption of this 
mechanism led states and non-profit organizations to develop mechanisms of 
their own through which resource users could satisfy federal mitigation obliga-
tions. For example, both Nevada and the Nature Conservancy developed pro-
tocols for the creation of tradeable mitigation credits.111 Private companies, 
like Barrick Gold and Newmont Mining, entered into memorandums of under-
standing with the Interior Department to develop and implement their own in-
novative approaches to mitigation, agreeing to marshal their resources to con-
serve sagebrush to facilitate approval of their mining projects.112 
The BLM also incorporated compensatory mitigation requirements in the 
DRECP. The plan governs permitting for extensive new alternative energy de-
velopment in high-potential areas of the California desert, while accounting for 
environmental harms.113 It accomplishes that task, in part, by designating “de-
velopment focus areas,” where the approval process for new alternative energy 
projects would be streamlined, and designating other “variance process lands” 
available for development contingent upon project proponents performing ac-
tivities to compensate for environmental impacts.114 The DRECP also estab-
lishes caps on the amount of ground disturbance that could occur simultane-
ously and relies upon compensatory mitigation to offset disturbances in excess 
of that cap.115 The BLM hoped that establishing this general planning frame-
work for the area would “increase compensatory mitigation effectiveness, du-
rability, transparency, and consistency.”116 
The BLM also relied upon compensatory mitigation requirements in ap-
proving several projects of national significance. For example, it included 
them in approving the Ivanpah Solar Facility, including for lost desert tortoise 
habitat.117 Similarly, BLM’s decision approving the TransWest Express Trans-
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mission Project required the project sponsor to offset impacts to wilderness 
values, to “calculate the final acreage of impacted lands with wilderness char-
acteristics,” and to engage in “preservation and/or restoration actions to im-
prove or protect the same amount of acres of wilderness characteristics.”118 
The Trump Administration dramatically reversed course. President Don-
ald Trump withdrew the Obama Mitigation Memorandum and initiated a poli-
cy of “energy dominance.”119 The President issued Executive Order 13,783, 
which directs all components of the executive branch to review all agency ac-
tions, practices, and policies and to identify those that “potentially burden the 
development or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular 
attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.”120 The bur-
dens so identified are to be revised or rescinded.121 
Policies at the Department of Interior swiftly changed too. At the behest 
of the Trump Administration, Congress exercised the Congressional Review 
Act to rescind the BLM’s new planning regulations.122 Soon after assuming 
office, Secretary Ryan Zinke withdrew the Landscape-Scale Mitigation Policy 
and in response to Executive Order 13,783, issued a Secretarial Order directing 
all components to review and identify policies that could burden energy devel-
opment.123 This resulted in a lengthy report listing regulations, policies, and 
practices that energy companies were required to follow, including compensa-
tory mitigation.124 Shortly thereafter, the BLM withdrew its own mitigation 
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policy and, in 2017, the Department’s Acting Solicitor issued a new legal opin-
ion (M-37046) to withdraw M-37039.125 On July 24, 2018, the BLM issued a 
new instruction memorandum that directs public lands managers to no longer 
“require compensatory mitigation from public lands users,” asserting that it lay 
beyond the BLM’s statutory authority under FLPMA.126 How this disclaimer 
of authority will affect earlier decisions—like the greater sage-grouse conser-
vation plans, DRECP, and TransWest Express Transmission Line—remains to 
be seen, particularly because Western governors have expressed significant 
concern about abandoning compensatory mitigation for sagebrush.127 
The Trump Administration’s new views of compensatory mitigation—as 
extortionate demands, or uncalled for burdens on industry—depart from the 
historic pattern of debates over the instrument and environmental law general-
ly. Political conservatives have tended to advocate in favor of market mecha-
nisms—like tradeable credit schemes—in place of more traditional, command 
and control techniques—like performance standards, technology requirements, 
use restrictions, or bans—favored by political liberals.128 This divide reflects 
disagreements about how to understand environmental problems. Political con-
servatives have tended to view environmental problems as an economic issue 
in which externalities cause an inefficient under-production of public goods. 
Political liberals have been more inclined to view environmental problems as a 
moral issue in which ecological systems are fundamentally non-monetizable 
and unique, environmental and economic interests are different in kind, and the 
former should take precedence.129 In that traditional discourse, compensatory 
mitigation naturally aligns with the conservative view because it is a quintes-
sential example of trading: environmental harms at one location or time are 
offset by benefits at another. Compensatory mitigation stands in significantly 
greater tension with the liberal view because it presumes that the environment 
is inherently fungible. Compensatory mitigation has also often occurred 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Memorandum (M-37046) from Acting Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to Sec’y et al., Dep’t of 
the Interior 2 (June 30, 2017); Memorandum (M-37039), supra note 107.  
 126 July 2018 Instruction Memorandum, supra note 29. 
 127 See Dan Elliot, Western Governors, Including Utah’s Gov. Gary Herbert, Say Ban on Land 
Deals Could Hurt Beleaguered Bird, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/
news/environment/2018/08/13/western-governors/ [https://perma.cc/JG7V-95T9]. 
 128 See Revesz, supra note 33, at 817–18 (explaining that the Trump Administration has “mounted 
an attack” on the cost-benefit analysis of environmental regulation, including a cap on regulatory costs 
that seems to ignore the net benefits of regulation). 
 129 These disagreements have often been fiercely fought. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich’s 
Contract with America included aggressive legislative proposals to inject strict economic principles, 
like cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment, into environmental law. See Robert L. 
Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach of) the Contract with America: 
Improving Environmental Policy or Destroying Environmental Protection?, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 9, 17 (1996). 
1068 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1045 
through market-based mechanisms that require affixing prices to environmen-
tal features like ecosystems and the environment, which some view as immoral 
or impossible.130 As a result, criticism of compensatory mitigation came large-
ly from environmentalists, who viewed it as a poor substitute for prohibiting 
harmful activities outright, particularly because evidence suggests that con-
structed or restored ecosystems can be a sorry substitute for those that are de-
stroyed or degraded.131 
Today, political liberals increasingly cast their arguments in economic 
terms, advocating for the consideration of ecosystem services—the economic 
value produced by healthy ecosystems—and co-benefits as a component of 
decision making.132 Political conservatives, on the other hand, have replaced a 
fundamentally economic approach to environmentalism with a rights-based 
vision of their own, grounded in the view that environmental regulation (and 
regulation more generally) fundamentally impinges on economic actors’ liberty 
interests. Equating compensatory mitigation with blackmail makes sense only 
if people required to offset the harms of their actions have a right, either legal 
or moral, to engage in such actions unencumbered. At the core, then, rejection 
of compensatory mitigation amounts to an assertion that economic actors have 
a fundamental right to degrade public goods—like the ecological health of 
public lands. If the public wants to secure such goods for itself, the logic goes, 
the public should pay for them. 
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC LAND LAW 
Assessing the wisdom and legality of compensatory mitigation requires a 
broader view of FLPMA’s place within the history and architecture of public 
land law. Defining public lands and the law that governs them is a thorny and 
indeterminate task because, as Professor John Leshy recently observed, “there 
is no universally accepted meaning of the term.”133 Although this Article fo-
cuses on the public lands as defined by FLPMA—i.e., federally owned lands 
managed by the BLM134—this Part takes a broader view and discusses federal-
ly owned property generally, addressing the body of laws, regulations, land use 
plans, and other enforceable rules applicable to that property.135 This usage 
recognizes that two centuries of public land law predated FLPMA, and the 
term “public lands” continues to be used to broadly encompass federal proper-
ty including National Parks, National Wildlife Refuges, National Forests, and 
National Monuments, and unreserved and undesignated federal land that re-
main in the public domain.136 After describing the history of public land law, 
this Part then addresses components of FLPMA that bear on the BLM’s author-
ity to require compensatory mitigation.137 
A. Shifting Paradigms for Public Lands 
The history of public land law lies at the epicenter of social transfor-
mation, philosophical evolution, shifting roles and capacities of the federal 
government, and increasingly sophisticated scientific understanding of natural 
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processes.138 FLPMA is an example of the latest phase of public land law, 
which emphasizes diverse public interests in public lands over the long term. 
Understanding the paradigms of the laws that governed public lands before 
FLPMA provides context for assessing the intended sweep of the statute. 
The Property Clause of Article IV of the Constitution undergirds the fed-
eral government’s control of its property, vesting in Congress the “power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory 
or other Property belonging to the United States.”139 Under the Property 
Clause, “Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legisla-
ture over the public domain.”140 
At a gross level, a standard account of America’s approach to public lands 
identifies an era of disposition that transitioned to an era of retention and man-
agement.141 Disposal, in this contemporary narrative, refers to policies divest-
ing the federal government of ownership in favor of privatization or ownership 
by states.142 This account doesn’t perfectly capture the sporadic and incon-
sistent nature of the law’s evolution: Congress first experimented with small-
scale efforts to manage, rather than privatize, public lands in the nineteenth 
century, creating a leasing regime for lands containing lead resources and re-
quiring royalty payments from leaseholders in the form of a proportion of the 
lead produced.143 The Mining Law of 1872, a privatization law, continues to 
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allow individuals locating hard rock minerals to acquire public resources at 
their own initiation, and until recently acquire fee title to the land when they 
did.144 
Crisply differentiating between a disposal era and a management era not 
only elides this inconsistent history, but masks important similarities stretching 
across time. One of the principles of public land law established early in the 
Republic that persists today is that Congress adopts general rules governing the 
public domain, while removing some lands in part or in whole from the appli-
cation of those general rules.145 Exempting certain lands from the rules appli-
cable to the public domain occurs through mechanisms commonly termed res-
ervations or withdrawals, which have related but distinct meanings.146 Alt-
hough the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, where they are differen-
tiated, a withdrawal describes the act of exempting public lands from laws en-
abling private individuals to acquire interests in them, while a reservation de-
scribes the act of creating a similar exemption coupled with establishing a 
dominant or exclusive use for the designated lands.147 Withdrawals and reser-
vations have become an increasingly important component of public land 
law,148 but even in the earliest days Congress and the Executive Branch recog-
nized that some land should be retained in federal ownership for designated 
public purposes.149 Military bases and lighthouses are prominent examples.150 
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These lands were reserved for long-term management for their designated pur-
poses and made unavailable for disposal, albeit they were relatively small are-
as.151 Today, withdrawals and reservations designate public lands for an array of 
uses, including as National Parks, National Monuments, and National Forests.152 
The standard (a)historical account also leaves out important finer-grained 
distinctions among land disposal statutes and among management statutes. Ra-
ther than tracing temporal eras in public land law, four dominant conceptual 
paradigms emerge throughout its history that strike different balances between 
the public and private interests adhering to public lands: disposition to generate 
revenue, disposition to promote preferred uses, retention and management to 
promote preferred uses, and retention and management to promote and resolve 
conflicts among a multiplicity of uses. The first two paradigms prioritized pri-
vate property and the rights of private individuals, resulting in the federal gov-
ernment transferring more than a billion acres of public lands to individuals, 
corporations, and states, leaving about 420 million acres in federal owner-
ship.153 As Congress enacted laws characterized by these successive para-
digms, it increasingly elevated long-term societal values over private profit in 
the lands remaining in federal ownership. Within this framework, FLPMA rep-
resents the culmination of Congress’s embrace of a paradigm in which the fed-
eral government manages public lands over the long term for the benefit of all 
Americans across all generations.154 
The disposition for revenue paradigm dominated the Nation’s early dec-
ades. The federal government needed money, and public lands and the natural 
resources they held were valuable assets, although for a variety of reasons, the 
sale of public lands never generated substantial revenue.155 Congress directed 
the Executive Branch to survey public lands into townships and sections and 
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serving area for military site and trading post). The reservation at issue in Wilcox comprised a little 
less than sixty acres. Id. at 502. 
 152 See Mansfield, supra note 146, at 842–52 (discussing national parks, wilderness areas, and 
wildlife refuges); Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 473, 476–86 (2003) (discussing history of national monuments established under the Antiquities 
Act). 
 153 See PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 5 (identifying the disposition of almost 1.3 
billion acres between 1781 and 2017); Comment, Management of Public Land Resources, supra note 
6, at 458. 
 154 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 155 See Leshy, supra note 133, at 518. 
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sell them at public auction.156 Lands containing valuable resources, such as 
coal lands, could be purchased at a higher price.157 Some lands—originally one 
section per township—were reserved from general sale to produce revenue for 
public education.158 Although laws contemplating outright sale of public lands as 
a means to generate revenue dwindled in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
they did not entirely disappear.159 The Surplus Reclamation Lands Disposal Law 
of 1920, which remained in effect until 1976, authorized auction of public lands 
that had been reserved for irrigation works but later deemed unnecessary,160 and 
FLPMA itself continues to allow sales in limited circumstances.161 
The sale paradigm gradually gave way as Congress enacted new statutes 
authorizing private parties to claim public lands for specific, preferred uses, 
sometimes for free and at others for a nominal fee.162 In 1862, Congress enact-
ed three laws that exemplify this paradigm. First, the Homestead Act promoted 
agriculture and settlement in the western United States by authorizing individ-
uals to acquire up to 160 acres of surveyed public lands “for the purpose of 
actual settlement and cultivation.”163 Second, the Morrill Act promoted public 
education by transferring public lands to state governments to establish land 
grant colleges emphasizing education related to “agriculture and the mechanic 
arts.”164 Finally, the Pacific Railway Act promoted construction of railways 
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound by granting both lands to serve as the route 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Sean M. Kammer, Railroad Land Grants in an Incongruous Legal System: Corporate 
Subsidies, Bureaucratic Governance, and Legal Conflict in the United States, 1850–1903, 35 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 391, 400 (2017) (“For several decades [following the founding of the United States] . . . 
[p]olicy makers believed that the public domain was one of the government’s most valuable assets and 
that the government should use it for raising revenues while also allowing for the orderly expansion of 
the body politic.”). 
 157 See ch. 205, § 1, 13 Stat. 343 (1864) (authorizing sale of coal lands at public auction for a 
minimum of $20 an acre); GATES, supra note 143, at 724. 
 158 See GATES, supra note 143, at 724; see also THE STATE TRUST LANDS, http://www.ti.org/
statetrusts.html [https://perma.cc/3B3V-M2DL] (identifying lands transferred to states). 
159 See ch. 561, § 9, 26 Stat. 1099 (1891). 
 160 See ch. 192, § 1, 41 Stat. 605 (repealed 1976). 
 161 43 U.S.C. § 1713 (2018). 
 162 ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 1, at ix. 
 163 Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976); see Kammer, supra note 156, at 401 
(explaining the Homestead Act); Darwin P. Roberts, The Legal History of Federally Granted Railroad 
Rights-of-Way and the Myth of Congress’s “1871 Shift,” 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 85, 126–27 (2011) 
(“The Homestead Act of 1862 . . . permitted settlers to acquire a farm out of the public domain, free of 
charge . . . .”). While the 1862 laws constituted a dramatic shift toward disposition for specific uses, 
some earlier laws had a similar tenor. For example, the Preemption Act of 1830 enabled squatters on 
public lands to purchase the land they occupied if they attested to their intent to improve it. See 
GATES, supra note 143, at 224–25 (describing the Preemption Act of 1830); Kammer, supra note 156, 
at 400 (same). 
 164 Pub. L. No. 37-108, 12 Stat. 503 (1862). 
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for the railway line and additional lands to subsidize construction costs.165 
These laws coexisted with others that transferred public lands to state govern-
ments in varying degrees at statehood.166 
In the decades that followed, Congress enacted more laws to promote fa-
vored uses through privatization. For example, the Mining Law of 1872 (which 
remains in effect) promoted mining of hard rock minerals by allowing prospec-
tors to stake claims to mineral resources on public lands and eventually acquire 
fee title.167 Congress later extended similar rights to individuals claiming lands 
containing building stone and petroleum.168 The Timber Culture Act of 1873 
promoted the planting and cultivation of trees, based in part on the antiquated 
view that trees could increase rainfall, by granting settlers an additional 160 
acres of public lands if they committed to planting and cultivating forty acres 
of trees.169 The Timber and Stone Act of 1878 enabled individuals to acquire 
160 acres of public lands unfit for cultivation to extract timber and stone, im-
portant materials needed for settlement.170 The Desert Lands Act of 1877 en-
couraged irrigation of arid lands by allowing individuals to acquire 640 acres 
of public lands so long as they constructed irrigation improvements within 
three years.171 Among the final law of this type was the Stock-Raising Home-
stead Act of 1916, which promoted animal agriculture by allowing individuals 
to acquire 640 acres of public lands for grazing purposes.172 
These laws resulted in large-scale privatization of public lands. As this 
occurred, Congress and the President increasingly recognized a public interest 
in retaining and managing public lands with certain characteristics for the 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Ch. 217, 13 Stat. 365 (1864); see Kammer, supra note 156, at 401 (discussing railway acts). 
 166 In 1796, Tennessee became the first new state within which the federal government owned 
land, and the federal government initially retained ownership and the power of disposition over lands 
in the western region of the state, with the remainder turned over to the state government. In 1846, 
Congress changed course and transferred the remainder of the federal land to the state. See GATES, 
supra note 143, at 287–88. By contrast, when Nevada, Colorado, and Nebraska were admitted, Con-
gress granted them two sections per township to support schools and a small amount of territory for 
other specified purposes. See id. 
 167 § 1, 17 Stat. at 91; see Kalen, supra note 144, at 343–44 (“The 1872 Mining Law stands alone 
in the field of public land laws as the last vestige of a nineteenth century congressional public land 
policy designed to settle and promote development in a now-populous west.”). 
 168 61 Stat. 526 (1897); ch. 375, § 1, 27 Stat. 348 (1892). 
 169 Ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873) (repealed 1891); see GATES, supra note 143, at 400. 
 170 Ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (1878) (repealed 1955); see U.S. PUBLIC LANDS COMM’N, USE AND 
ABUSE OF AMERICA’S NATURAL RESOURCES, S. DOC. NO. 189, at v (3d Sess. 1905) (“The law was 
enacted to meet the demands of settlers, miners, and others for timber and stone for building, mining, 
and other purposes.”); Michael C. Blumm & Kara Tebeau, Antimonopoly in American Public Land 
Law, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 178 (2016) (describing the Timber and Stone Act). 
 171 Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.); see 
GATES, supra note 143, at 638–43. 
 172 Ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 301 (2018)). 
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long-term promotion of socially beneficial uses. Beginning in 1872, Congress 
began reserving public lands as national parks,173 and it established the Na-
tional Park Service in 1916, the same year it enacted the Stock Raising Home-
stead Act.174 In 1964, Congress enacted the Wilderness Act to reserve desig-
nated wildlands for preservation.175 Congress also enacted legislation empow-
ering the President or Secretary of the Interior to withdraw or reserve public 
lands with other characteristics, including those containing forests,176 historical 
and scientific resources,177 and sites useful for the development of water-power 
and irrigation projects.178 
The Executive Branch also asserted power to withdraw lands without ex-
press delegation of authority from Congress, a practice that the Supreme Court 
endorsed in its 1915 decision United States v. Midwest Oil Co.179 There, the 
Court held that Congress had acquiesced to this assertion of executive power 
by failing to intervene notwithstanding the effectuation of nearly one hundred 
withdrawals between 1870 and 1902 that had been reported to Congress.180 In 
the early twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt exercised this non-
statutory authority to direct the Secretary of the Interior to withdraw sixty-six 
million acres of coal lands.181 President Howard Taft followed suit and with-
drew all federally owned petroleum resources.182 
The withdrawal of resources like forests, coal, and petroleum required new 
rules to manage public lands. Congress authorized regulation of forests on public 
lands in 1891, including identification of “tracts of land where timber may be 
cut,”183 and created a system of national forests to conserve timber resources.184 
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 directed the creation of a leasing system for 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Yellowstone Act, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (1872). 
 174 National Park Service Organic Act, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 430(hh) (2018)).  
 175 Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 1131 (2018)). 
 176 See Forest Service Organic Act, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897); General Revision Act, 26 Stat. 1103 
(1891). 
 177 Antiquities Act, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320,301–320,303 
(2018)). 
 178 Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 2, 36 Stat. 487 (1910) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 142 (2018)). 
 179 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
 180 Id. at 480–81. 
 181 See GATES, supra note 143, at 726. 
 182 See id. at 732–33. The Pickett Act legislatively validated the coal and petroleum withdrawals. 
See id. at 735–36. 
 183 Ch. 560, 26 Stat. 1094 (1891). This function resided in the Department of the Interior until 
1905, when Congress transferred the management of national forests to the Department of Agricul-
ture. Transfer Act of 1905, ch. 288, Pub. L. No. 58-34, 33 Stat. 628. 
 184 See Forest Service Organic Act, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34 (1897). 
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fossil fuels and chemicals used in fertilizer.185 And the Taylor Grazing Act of 
1934 repealed the Stock Raising Homestead Act to replace the system of privat-
izing range resources with a permit system to govern their management.186 
Conflicts among potential uses for public lands always existed; for exam-
ple, the Preemption Laws of the early Republic resolved the potential conflict 
between the auction of lands and squatters who had improved them without 
first acquiring title.187 Resolving these conflicts consisted of simply determin-
ing who among competing claimants should acquire title. Managing public 
lands on an ongoing basis, rather than privatizing them, presented new chal-
lenges that could only be resolved by accounting for different, conflicting us-
es.188 Over time, Congress arrived at a new model for addressing conflicts, 
directing that public lands be managed for multiple uses, rather than a single, 
favored use. The Multiple Mineral Development Act of 1954 is an early exam-
ple aiming to reconcile conflicts between two distinct uses, leased minerals 
and locatable minerals.189 Congress took a much broader approach when it en-
acted the Multiple Use and Sustained Yields Act of 1960, which broadened 
U.S. Forest Service management of national forests to account for all compet-
ing uses, with a directive to ensure long-term sustainability.190 Congress ex-
tended those multiple use principles to the public domain on a temporary basis 
through the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964,191 and convened a Pub-
lic Land Law Review Commission to broadly review public land law.192 Con-
gress directed the Commission to recommend legislation to further a policy that 
public lands “shall be (a) retained and managed or (b) disposed of, all in a man-
ner to provide the maximum benefit for the general public” and directed the 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2018)); see GATES, 
supra note 143, at 740–41 (describing other leasing laws of similar vintage). 
 186 Taylor Grazing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934); see GATES, supra note 143, at 
516–17. 
 187 See Leshy, supra note 133, at 519–20. 
 188 See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 1, at ix (identifying an “inability of Con-
gress and the administrators of public lands to resolve all the conflicting demands being made on the 
lands”). Professor Robert Keiter describes Congress’s adoption of multiple use management for the 
public domain and national forests, alongside reservation of increasing public land for conservation 
purposes, as constituting a “nature conservation period” that succeeded a “period of retention and 
management.” Keiter, supra note 148, at 1129–31. This delineation has power, particularly in view of 
the various conservation designations Congress has adopted. With respect to undesignated public 
lands, however, multiple use management comprises a recognition that conservation values should be 
placed alongside, but not above, other uses. 
 189 Ch. 730, Pub. L. No. 83-585, 68 Stat. 708 (1954). 
 190 Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2018)). 
 191 Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986. 
 192 Public Land Law Review Commission Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 3, 78 Stat. 
982 (1964). 
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Commission to recommend legislation to further that policy.193 Based upon 
those recommendations, Congress enacted FLPMA, rejecting privatization 
wholesale, in favor of the multiple use framework that continues today.194 
B. Managing Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission issued a report urging 
Congress to adopt legislation to fully embrace the management paradigm for 
public lands.195 Over the next six years, Congress debated legislation to im-
plement the Commission’s recommendations.196 These deliberations came to 
fruition on October 21, 1976, when Congress enacted FLPMA to establish an 
overarching framework for the Department’s management of public lands, and 
it remains bedrock today, establishing the principles under and processes for 
the BLM to manage the vast and diverse public lands.197 
FLPMA constituted a sea-change in public land law. As one Senate Re-
port for the legislation explained: “While the Nation has come to regard the 
national resource lands as a permanent national asset which, for the most part, 
should be retained and managed on a multiple use, sustained yield basis, the 
only management tools available for this purpose remain some 3,000 public 
land laws which have accumulated over the last 170 years.”198 In place of the 
“often conflicting, on occasion truly contradictory, and to a serious extent, in-
complete and inadequate” body of public land laws,199 FLPMA provided com-
prehensive authority to manage public lands. The Act includes an array of pro-
visions, some broad in application and some narrow, not all of which are cata-
logued here. Instead, this Section focuses on FLPMA’s basic framework as 
relevant to compensatory mitigation requirements. It describes provisions that 
charge the BLM with engaging in land use planning—the Land Use Planning 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id. §§ 2, 4. 
 194 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 195 See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 1; Keiter, supra note 148, at 1129–31. 
 196 See John A. Carver, Jr., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: Fruition or Frus-
tration, 54 DENV. L.J. 387, 398–99 (1977) (describing efforts to implement Public Land Commission 
recommendations before FLPMA). See generally Schwartz, supra note 10 (detailing legislation intro-
duced prior to FLPMA). 
 197 43 U.S.C. § 1701. Established in 1946 to consolidate the functions of the General Land Office 
and Grazing Service, the BLM existed for several decades before FLPMA. See JAMES MUHN & HAN-
SON R. STUART, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE: THE STORY OF BLM 
54 (1988). 
 198 S. COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., S. REP. NO. 94-583, at 24 (1st 
Sess. 1975). A few relatively minor provisions included within the Senate bill for which this report 
was prepared—related to grazing, mining, and applicability to national forests—were modified 
through a conference committee to resolve differences with the U.S. House of Representatives, but the 
purpose and structure of the law remained the same. See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 298–99. 
 199 S. REP. NO. 94-583, at 24. 
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Mandate;200 that require the BLM to adhere to principles of multiple use and 
sustained yield—the Multiple Use Mandate;201 and that compel the BLM to 
prevent unnecessary and undue degradation of the land—the Anti-Degradation 
Mandate.202 These provisions can be divided into three categories based on the 
private activities they affect. Certain provisions of FLPMA apply to all uses of 
public lands, including hard rock mining. Others apply to uses except for hard 
rock mining. 
FLPMA prioritizes retention and management of public lands to obtain 
long-term societal benefits.203 FLPMA repealed dozens of public land laws 
governing the disposal and use of public lands and through it Congress an-
nounced a general policy that public lands be retained and managed.204 Public 
lands could still be disposed, something that remains true today,205 but only if 
the federal government determined that a particular parcel would better serve 
the public if transferred into private hands.206 FLPMA thus represented a dra-
matic departure from prior regimes. Before FLPMA, privatization itself was 
thought to serve the public interest without regard to the specific lands at issue 
and private individuals could themselves initiate the process for transferring 
public lands, rather than requiring public land managers to do so.207 The gen-
eral management directives of FLPMA do not, however, apply to hard rock 
mining under the Mining Law of 1872, which continues to allow miners to 
acquire public lands by locating valuable minerals.208 
FLPMA’s Multiple Use Mandate establishes multiple use and sustained 
yield as the governing principle for public land management, unless areas are 
designated for a specific, dominant use under other laws.209 The authority to 
implement the Multiple Use Mandate is capacious: The Act vests the Interior 
Secretary with authority to “regulate . . . the use and occupancy, and develop-
ment of the public lands” through “easements, permits, leases, licenses, pub-
lished rules, or other instruments as the Secretary deems appropriate.”210 The 
phrase “multiple use” is defined in a passage that is full of texture: 
                                                                                                                           
 200 43 U.S.C. § 1711 (2018). 
 201 Id. § 1702(c). 
 202 Id. § 1732(b). 
 203 Id. § 1701(a)(1). 
 204 Id. 
 205 See John C. Ruple, The Transfer of Public Lands Movement: The Battle to Take “Back” 
Lands That Were Never Theirs, 29 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2017) 
(“[T]he BLM still managed to dispose of over twenty-four million acres of land between 1990 and 
2010 . . . .”). 
 206 43 U.S.C. § 1713. 
 207 See supra notes 167–178 and accompanying text. 
 208 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 209 Id. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1712(c)(1). 
 210 Id. § 1732(b). 
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The term “multiple use” means the management of the public lands 
and their various resource values so that they are utilized in the 
combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the 
American people; making the most judicious use of the land for 
some or all of these resources or related services over areas large 
enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use 
to conform to changing needs and conditions; the use of some land 
for less than all of the resources; a combination of balanced and di-
verse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of 
future generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, in-
cluding, but not limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, wa-
tershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical 
values; and harmonious and coordinated management of the various 
resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the 
land and the quality of the environment with consideration being 
given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to 
the combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return 
or the greatest unit output.211 
Sustained yields is defined more tersely to mean “the achievement and mainte-
nance in perpetuity of a high-level annual or regular periodic output of the var-
ious renewable resources of the public lands consistent with multiple use.”212 
These two definitions are mutually reinforcing, establishing a mandate requir-
ing the BLM to delicately balance the needs of current and future generations, 
and economic and environmental values. 
FLPMA sections 201 and 202 establish the Land Use Planning Mandate. 
Section 201 requires the Secretary to inventory public land resources and val-
ues, creating information about potential uses, and use conflicts, to serve as the 
basis for land use planning.213 This inventory process is iterative and future 
oriented, like many of FLPMA’s provisions, and requires that the Secretary, 
acting through the BLM, identify and catalogue new and emerging values to 
prevent land use plans from becoming stale and disconnected from evolving 
                                                                                                                           
 211 Id. § 1702(c). 
 212 Id. § 1702(h). 
 213 Id. § 1711(a); see id. § 1712(c)(4) (requiring reliance on the § 202 inventory as the basis for 
land use planning); GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAW § 16:20 (2d ed. 2018) (“BLM planning begins with compilation of available lands and 
resources.”). As well as serving as the basis for land use planning, the inventory of resources also 
serves as the basis for the BLM to identify wilderness study areas under § 603 of FLPMA. 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1782. Nonetheless, the federal government has long taken the position that the § 603 identification 
of wilderness study areas, unlike the § 202 inventory process, is not an ongoing source of authority. 
See Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96-CV-0870, 2006 WL 2711798, at *8 (D. Utah Sept. 20, 2006), aff’d, 
Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 535 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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societal needs.214 To make that concrete, consider wind on public lands. In 
1976, the BLM may not have recognized wind as an important resource, but as 
wind technology has improved and the demand for renewable energy has in-
creased, FLPMA requires the agency to inventory this resource.215 
Section 202 requires the BLM to develop and revise land use plans—
referred to as resource management plans (RMPs)—to govern the use of public 
lands based on inventories of resources and values.216 FLPMA requires the 
development and revision of RMPs because the “national interest” would be 
served if public lands’ “present and future use is projected through a land use 
planning process coordinated with other Federal and State planning efforts.”217 
Although statutory directives guide land use planning—for example that the 
Secretary must “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained 
yield,” and “give priority to the designation and protection of areas of critical 
environmental concern”218—the mechanics of the land use planning process 
are largely left for the Secretary to decide, so long as “Federal, State, and local 
governments and the public” have adequate opportunities to participate.219 
Once the BLM promulgates an RMP, it must comply with its terms when mak-
ing management decisions.220 
Finally, section 302 establishes the Anti-Degradation Mandate and, unlike 
other provisions of FLPMA, this mandate applies to hard rock mining activi-
ties as well as all other land uses. Section 302(b) provides that “[i]n managing 
the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any action 
necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”221 It also 
directs that “[e]xcept as provided” by the Anti-Degradation Mandate, and a 
few other miscellaneous provisions of FLPMA, “no provision . . . of this Act 
shall in any way amend the Mining Law of 1872 or impair the rights of any 
locators or claims under that Act.”222 The negative implication of that sentence 
is, of course, that the Anti-Degradation Mandate amends the Mining Law of 
1872 and can modify and limit the rights of miners. 
                                                                                                                           
 214 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (“This inventory shall be kept current so as to reflect changes in condi-
tions and to identify new and emerging resource and other values.”). 
 215 See, e.g., Instruction Memorandum (No. 2009-043) from Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., to All 
Field Officials, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://blmwyomingvisual.anl.gov/docs/IM_
2009-043_BLMWindEnergyDevelopmentPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7AM-UZ2P]. 
 216 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). 
 217 Id. § 1701 (a)(2). 
 218 Id. § 1712(c)(1), (c)(3). 
 219 Id. § 1712(f). 
 220 Id. § 1732(a). 
 221 Id. § 1732(b). 
 222 Id. 
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III. AUTHORITY FOR COMPENSATORY MITIGATION ON PUBLIC LANDS 
This Part revisits the Land Use Mandate, Multiple Use Mandate, and Anti-
Degradation Mandate and explains that these interwoven statutory directives 
provide the BLM with ample authority to require compensatory mitigation.223 To 
aid in this examination, this Part first provides a schematic of the categories of 
decisions made by the BLM and links them to sources of statutory authority.224 It 
closes with an assessment of what, if any, deference is owed to the BLM’s cur-
rent, contrary view that it lacks authority to require compensatory mitigation.225 
A. Categorizing Management Decisions 
The BLM manages public lands through nested decisions, with each more 
specific tier relying on or incorporating those made at a prior, more general 
tier. For example, a decision to approve an oil well may involve each of the 
following steps: (1) adopting or amending an RMP to identify oil and gas de-
velopment as an allowable use of the relevant public lands,226 (2) authorizing a 
party to explore for oil and gas resources and identifying terms and conditions 
to be followed during prospecting,227 (3) receiving notice that exploration is 
complete and determining if “rehabilitation of the lands is satisfactory,”228 (4) 
receiving a nomination for competitive leasing, evaluating the public lands 
included in the nomination, deciding whether to include them in a lease sale, 
and, if so, noticing the lease sale,229 (5) determining what royalty rate and 
which conditions and stipulations to include in the offered leases,230 (6) hold-
ing a public auction and issuing leases to winning bidders,231 and (7) approving 
an “Application for Permit to Drill” (APD) submitted by a lease-holder and 
determining what, if any, additional environmental conditions should be im-
                                                                                                                           
 223 See infra notes 226–318 and accompanying text. 
 224 See infra notes 226–305 and accompanying text. 
 225 See infra notes 306–318 and accompanying text. 
 226 Until recently, the BLM developed a Master Leasing Plan following adoption of an RMP to 
govern oil and gas leasing in an area. Instruction Memorandum (No. 2013-101) from Acting Dir., 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., to State Dirs., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Jan. 28, 2013), https://www.blm.gov/
policy/im-2013-101-0 [https://perma.cc/4ZZR-2WSR]. The BLM has, however, announced it will no 
longer do so because it views this process as duplicative of the RMP. Instruction Memorandum (No. 
2018-034) from Deputy Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., to All Field Officials, Bureau of Land Mgmt. 
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2018-034 [https://perma.cc/4Z8G-WEA4]. 
 227 43 C.F.R. § 3151.1 (2019). The BLM refers to this authorization as a “Notice of Intent to 
Conduct Oil and Gas Exploration Operations.” Id. Similar procedures apply to oil and gas exploration 
activities in Alaska pursuant to a different set of regulations. See id. §§ 3152.1–.7. 
 228 Id. § 3151.2. 
 229 Id. §§ 3120.1–.4. 
 230 Id. § 3120.4-1. 
 231 Id. § 3120.5. 
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posed on drilling activities.232 This set of processes includes at least three op-
portunities for the BLM to impose compensatory mitigation requirements, 
which can be categorized as planning decisions, non-project-approval imple-
mentation decisions, and project approval.233 Similar categories of decision 
exist for other land uses—e.g., transmission lines, wind farms, and grazing—
although here too FLPMA treats hard rock mining differently, because the 
BLM does not lease hard-rock minerals and has limited authority to regulate 
mining through the process of land use planning.234 
The Sections that follow examine FLPMA’s provisions and explain how 
they authorize compensatory mitigation in appropriate circumstances. The ta-
ble below indicates which of these authorities applies to which category of de-
cisions. 
Tier of Decision Examples 








Land Use Planning  Resource Man-agement Plan Always Always Maybe 
Implementation  
Travel Manage-
ment Plan, Lease 
Sale 
Always Always Always 
Project Approval 





Always Always Always 
Hard Rock Min-
ing Approval Plan of Operations Maybe No Always 
The broadest scale of public land management occurs through the adop-
tion and revision of RMPs.235 The Secretary has delegated land use planning to 
the BLM,236 which has issued regulations to govern the planning processes.237 
RMPs resemble comprehensive zoning ordinances adopted by state and local 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Id. § 3162.3-1. 
 233 Some implementation decisions, like travel management planning, share features with the land 
use planning more generally. The distinction remains an important one, however, because it affects 
how interested parties may pursue administrative appeals or protests. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., 
LAND USE PLANNING HANDBOOK H-1601-1, at app. E (2005) [hereinafter LAND USE PLANNING 
HANDBOOK], https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/lup/69026/89780/107362/h1601-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKH6-DPGL] (discussing appeal and protest procedures for land use and im-
plementation decisions). 
 234 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2018). 
 235 See supra notes 216–220 and accompanying text. 
 236 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL (235 DM 1), at 1 (2009), https://www.
doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/chapter_1_general_program_delegation_director_bureau_
of_land_management.pdf [https://perma.cc/74ZM-3FBB] (“The Director, Bureau of Land Management, 
is authorized . . . to exercise the program authority of the Assistant Secretary[,] Land and Minerals 
Management with respect to the management of the public domain and acquired lands, including all 
associated functions that relate thereto.”). 
 237 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 1601.0-1–1610.8 (2019). 
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land use planning agencies and provide a basic blueprint for land uses within 
their geographical scope. As the regulations explain, an RMP is “designed to 
guide and control future management actions and the development of subse-
quent, more detailed and limited scope plans for resources and uses.”238 The 
BLM typically develops an RMP for the public lands within a state managed 
by each field office.239 Like all BLM decisions, RMPs are formally subject to 
the Anti-Degradation Mandate, although courts have allowed the BLM to defer 
compliance with this obligation until implementation and project approval de-
cisions.240 Hard rock mining is generally exempted from the BLM’s land use 
planning authority, except to the extent that the BLM decides to address the 
Anti-Degradation Mandate through the planning process.241 
As their name suggests, implementation decisions carry out RMPs. The 
BLM has generally defined all decisions other than the adoption or amendment 
of RMPs as falling into this category.242 Nonetheless, important differences 
exist between decisions that implement RMPs at a general level, like leasing 
decisions, and those that approve the projects of specific parties. Although im-
plementation decisions are not themselves subject to the Land Use Planning 
Mandate, they must be consistent with the applicable RMP and they must sat-
isfy the Multiple Use and Anti-Degradation Mandates.243 
Project approvals also must conform to the applicable RMP and any high-
er-order implementation decisions.244 So, for example, the BLM can only issue 
an APD that incorporates conditions identified in the RMP and the lease itself. 
Project approvals also must themselves comply with the Multiple Use and An-
ti-Degradation Mandates. Because project approvals often crystalize the envi-
ronmental effects of a land use, some environmental effects can most easily be 
addressed at this stage, although where the BLM is authorizing development of 
resources that have already been leased, equitable and contract considerations 
may impose limits on what new conditions can be imposed.245 The BLM gen-
                                                                                                                           
 238 Id. § 1601.0-2. 
 239 Id. § 1610.1(b). 
 240 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2003) (accepting the De-
partment of the Interior’s representation that “it will protect the public lands from any UUD by exer-
cising case-by-case discretion”). 
 241 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 242 See LAND USE PLANNING HANDBOOK, supra note 233, at app. E. 
 243 See 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (“The Secretary shall manage the public lands under principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield, in accordance with the land use plans . . . when they are available 
. . . .”). 
 244 Id. 
 245 See, e.g., Memorandum from Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to Assistant Sec’y for Policy, 
Management & Budget et al. 4 (May 13, 2003), https://doi.opengov.ibmcloud.com/sites/doi.opengov.
ibmcloud.com/files/uploads/M-37008.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8K4-YN8C] (noting authority of Secre-
tary to cancel grazing permit through FLPMA’s land use planning process); Jan G. Laitos & Richard 
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erally has a more limited ability to impose conditions when authorizing the 
development of resources already subject to a lease that would effectively pre-
clude development altogether than if it had included such conditions in a lease 
when it was issued (or simply decided not to issue a lease at all).246 Project 
approvals typically are also the point at which the BLM ensures that hard rock 
mining operations do not violate the Anti-Degradation Mandate.247 
B. Applying the Multiple Use Mandate 
FLPMA departs from earlier paradigms of public land law because it re-
jects privatization as the primary policy instrument for public land management 
and the development of a few, preferred land uses as the primary goal.248 In-
stead, the Multiple Use Mandate embraces a multiplicity of conflicting, evolv-
ing, and sometimes controversial uses and values of importance to the American 
people; furthermore, in conjunction with the statute’s management authority 
provisions, it vests the BLM with broad authority to provide for those uses 
across the vast expanse of lands in its charge.249 The Mandate establishes the 
polestar for all public land management, other than hard rock mining, and directs 
the BLM to take both a broad and long view of the social values adhering to 
public lands and the benefits that potentially conflicting uses can provide.250 Alt-
hough the BLM need not always prioritize the environment over other uses, 
compensatory mitigation offers a means to address resource conflicts and pro-
vide for long-term multiple uses of public lands because it enables one use to 
occur—e.g., oil drilling—while offsetting impacts to other uses—e.g., wildlife 
habit.251 
Statutes through which Congress delegates land management authority to 
the Executive Branch, like the Multiple Use Mandate, are broadly construed, 
because “[i]n the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide 
                                                                                                                           
A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 14 (1987) (discussing government authority over leased interests in public lands). 
 246 Where the BLM determines that a project violates the Anti-Degradation Mandate, the BLM 
may, and indeed must, either deny the permit or include whatever conditions are necessary to avoid 
that result. See Debra L. Donahue, Federal Rangeland Policy: Perverting Law and Jeopardizing Eco-
system Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 299, 347–48 (2007) (“If a miner’s vested property in-
terest in public lands may be regulated to the point of prohibiting a ‘necessary’ mining operation be-
cause it would ‘unduly harm’ the land, exercise of the grazing ‘privilege’ certainly may be prohibited 
for the same reason.”). 
 247 See Mineral Policy Ctr., 292 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 248 See supra notes 162–186 and accompanying text. 
 249 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FLPMA, supra note 40, at vi. 
 250 See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text. 
 251 See Hein, supra note 69, at 40 (arguing that “Interior has discretion to carry out its capacious 
statutory mandates in a manner that seeks to maximize social welfare”). 
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general regulations for the[] various and varying details of management.”252 
Thus, the Supreme Court held in 1911 in United States v. Grimaud that a pro-
vision authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to “regulate the[] occupancy 
and use [of National Forests], and to preserve the forests thereon from destruc-
tion” encompasses authority to require grazing permits and to “charge for the 
privilege of grazing sheep on the reserve.”253 Although the Secretary’s authori-
ty is not unlimited, Congress empowered him to manage the lands in his care 
in pursuit of the “matters clearly indicated” by Congress.254 Put differently, the 
grant of authority to regulate occupancy and use of National Forests includes 
the power to preserve them through mechanisms determined appropriate by the 
Department of Agriculture.255 FLPMA includes remarkably similar language, 
enabling the BLM to “regulate . . . occupancy and use” in furtherance of the 
Multiple Use Mandate,256 and the extent of that authority should similarly be 
construed to encompasses management tools, like compensatory mitigation, 
that advance the objectives established by Congress. 
The breadth of the objectives that comprise the Multiple Use Mandate re-
inforce the breadth of BLM’s authority, because Congress recognized that pub-
lic lands serve a panoply of “competing values . . . as diverse as the lands 
themselves.”257 As the BLM explained when developing its original regula-
tions to govern land use planning, the agency must consider the full range of 
public lands resources “includ[ing] all public land values; renewable and non-
renewable resources of all types.”258 The BLM has long recognized that the 
temporal dimension of the Multiple Use Mandate means that the agency must 
not only address conflicts among uses today, but also “indicate the direction of 
any change needed in resource use or management” to address the needs of 
tomorrow.259 
                                                                                                                           
 252 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516 (1911); see United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 
Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939) (“From the earliest days the Congress has been compelled to leave to 
the administrative officers of the Government authority to determine . . . the details of regulations 
which would implement the more general enactments.”). 
 253 220 U.S. at 515, 522. 
 254 Id. at 522. 
 255 United States v. Hymans, 463 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1972) (“As long as such rules and 
regulations tend to protect the lands and faithfully preserve the interest of the people of the whole 
country in the lands, the courts should enforce such rules and regulations.” (quoting United States v. 
Reeves, 39 F. Supp. 580, 583 (W.D. Ark. 1941))). 
 256 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). 
 257 Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1982). 
 258 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,764, 58,765 (Bureau of Land Mgmt. 
Dec. 15, 1978) (proposed rule). The regulations were finalized in 1979. Public Lands and Resources; 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,386 (Aug. 7, 1979) (to be codified at 43 
C.F.R. pt. 1600). 
 259 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,766. 
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The Multiple Use Mandate allows for substantial debate and contestation 
about which uses should be prioritized, how much, and where. Unlike earlier 
laws designed to privatize public lands,260 it does not, however, permit deci-
sions blinkered to future generations or elevating short-term private profit over 
long-term public interests.261 Although the Multiple Use Mandate encompasses 
numerous uses of public lands from which private entities may profit, benefit-
ing private interests is not its goal. That energy production is among the identi-
fied uses, for example, does not mean that the law aims to profit oil companies. 
Every use of public lands is valued because of the benefits provided to the 
public.262 Put differently, oil development on public lands occurs not to enrich 
oil companies and executives, but to create a stable energy supply, promote 
national security interests, and generate revenue that can be used to carry out 
the business of the federal government. To provide an example with less politi-
cal valence, when the BLM adopted its Special Recreation Permit Policy in 
1984 to govern the issuance of permits to commercial recreation businesses, it 
explained “[t]he key objective for the BLM is dependable, safe service to the 
public. While the Bureau does not have an obligation to guarantee financial 
success to a commercial permittee, economically healthy operators are in a 
much better position to provide safer, more enjoyable trips, which is clearly in 
the best interest of the public.”263 
The Multiple Use Mandate does not, of course, mean that the BLM must 
manage all public lands for all uses. Such a task would be impossible, particu-
larly in circumstances that involve absolute use conflicts.264 Oil drilling may 
displace recreation; off-road vehicle use may destroy habitat. Rather, the BLM 
has significant discretion to engage in “delicate balancing” to determine which 
uses should be accommodated in which areas, although this discretion should 
be tethered to evolving understanding of public lands, their ecosystems, and 
the array of services they provide.265 The BLM must also account for the seri-
                                                                                                                           
 260 See supra notes 162–172 and accompanying text. 
 261 Gifford Pinchot encapsulated the Multiple Use Mandate, although it had not yet been articu-
lated in law, in a 1905 letter of instructions he sent to the U.S. Forest Service, explaining: “[A]ll land 
is to be devoted to its most productive use for the permanent good of the whole people, and not for the 
temporary benefit of individuals or companies . . . . [W]here conflicting interests must be reconciled 
the question will always be decided from the standpoint of the greatest good of the greatest number in 
the long run.” Keiter, supra note 148, at 1159–60 (quoting GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW 
GROUND 261 (1947)). 
 262 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2018). 
 263 Special Recreation Permit Policy, 49 Fed. Reg. 5300, 5301 (Bureau of Land Mgmt. Feb. 10, 
1984) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 8560). 
 264 See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 265 New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 710 (10th Cir. 
2009); see Friends of the Bow Predator Project, 139 Interior Dec. 141, 143–44 (IBLA 1997) (“[N]ot 
every possible use can take place fully on any given area of public lands at any one time.”). 
2020] Compensatory Mitigation and Public Lands 1087 
ous and direct economic injury that can result from environmental degradation. 
In an era in which private markets have developed to facilitate payments for 
the ecosystem services provided by private property,266 public land managers 
should consider them too as among the mix of uses provided by public lands. 
Compensatory mitigation offers a vital tool to accomplish multiple use man-
agement because it carves a middle path between barring a use entirely and 
allowing it to proceed without offsetting its impacts. Through it, the BLM may 
dedicate an area of public lands to large-scale industrial extractive activities 
while ensuring that the uses and values eliminated or degraded from those ac-
tivities can flourish elsewhere. 
FLPMA does not, therefore, require compensatory mitigation to offset all 
impacts, and indeed attempting to do so would itself be a virtually impossible 
task. Rather, the BLM has broad discretion to decide which uses to accommo-
date through compensatory mitigation, or other management instruments at its 
disposal.267 The Multiple Use Mandate would even allow the BLM to deter-
mine that a particular use no longer serves societal needs and should not be facil-
itated at all, because Congress expressly recognized that the “needs and condi-
tions” of public lands may change.268 For example, science has disproven the 
nineteenth century belief that planting trees in arid climates will draw rain.269 If 
someone sought to grow forest on public lands for the purpose of controlling 
rainfall, the BLM could reasonably decide that it need not consider this as a use 
in the mix for which it manages.270 This broad discretion to select uses and man-
age conflicts among them does not, however, undermine the legitimacy of com-
pensatory mitigation as a tool for managing those uses deemed appropriate. 
C. Implementing the Land Use Planning Mandate 
When Congress enacted FLPMA, compensatory mitigation was a familiar 
land use planning tool for municipal planners, and it is therefore a component 
of the Land Use Planning Mandate.271 The drafters of FLPMA understood that 
“land use planning” was “a term now in general usage and permits a large va-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See, e.g., James Salzman et al., Payments for Ecosystem Service: Past, Present and Future, 6 
TEX. A&M L. REV. 199, 200 (2018) (describing the development of payment for ecosystem services). 
 267 See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he Bureau has wide discretion to determine how those principles [of multiple use management] 
should be applied.”); Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975) (describing the multiple 
use management as “breath[ing] discretion at every pore”). 
 268 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 269 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 270 Professor Deborah Donahue has argued that grazing should no longer be considered a legiti-
mate use of public lands because of its insignificance for food production and the considerable harms 
it poses. Donahue, supra note 246, at 299. 
 271 See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text. 
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riety of techniques and procedures.”272 Interpreting FLPMA based on the con-
temporaneous meaning of that phrase follows familiar tools of statutory con-
struction,273 particularly because it constitutes a term of art that should be con-
strued based on the “body of learning from which it was taken.”274 
The historical record is clear. By 1976, land use planning had been a cor-
nerstone of local and state governments for decades.275 Municipal governments 
first engaged in land use planning in the early twentieth century, and New York 
City adopted the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1916.276 Only a dec-
ade later, the Department of Commerce published a Standard City Planning 
Enabling Act to promote municipal land use planning.277 By 1926 more than 
half of the U.S. population lived in a municipality that had adopted compre-
hensive zoning.278 Many land use planning agencies require developers to offset 
the impacts of their development through exactions, including by paying impact 
fees or dedicating land, and the Supreme Court has validated this approach as an 
appropriate mechanism to require that property owners internalize the costs as-
sociated with their activities.279 By expressly requiring the BLM to “develop, 
maintain, and when appropriate, revise land use plans which provide by tracts or 
areas for the use of the public lands,”280 FLPMA authorizes the ordinary and 
traditional techniques of land use planning, including compensatory mitigation, 
to “insure that actions on public lands are based upon the best available infor-
mation and sound land use planning.”281 Moreover, the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress understood mitigation to be a legitimate tool of land use 
                                                                                                                           
 272 H.R. COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., H.R. DOC. NO. 94-1163, at 5 
(2d Sess. 1976). 
 273 See, e.g., Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (“[I]t’s a ‘fundamen-
tal canon of statutory construction’ that words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking their ordi-
nary, contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” (quoting Perrin 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))). 
 274 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“[W]here Congress borrows terms of 
art . . . it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word 
in the body of learning from which it was taken . . . .”). 
 275 See supra Part II.A. 
 276 See John R. Nolon, Zoning’s Centennial: A Complete Account of the Evolution of Zoning into 
a Robust System of Land Use Law—1916–2016 (Part I), 39 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 1, 1 (2016). 
 277 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 59. 
 278 Herbert Hoover, Foreword to U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE PLANNING 
ENABLING ACT, at iii (rev. ed. 1926). 
 279 See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 605 (2013). 
 280 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2018). 
 281 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,764. Further underscoring its 
recognition that Congress intended it to draw upon the discipline of land use planning, the BLM con-
tracted with the American Society of Planning Officials to evaluate the planning procedures it would 
need to fully implement FLPMA. Id. 
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planning, because the Public Land Law Review Commission Report describes 
potential zoning classifications incorporating mitigation requirements.282 
FLPMA directs the BLM to develop regulations to govern its planning 
process, which it first did in 1979, just three years after Congress enacted 
FLPMA.283 These regulations are largely procedural in nature, and it is there-
fore not surprising that they do not address the potential for RMPs to require 
mitigation measures in any degree of detail. The regulations do, however, re-
quire that “for all uses the plan establishes appropriate terms and conditions to 
insure coordination and resource protection.”284 RMPs shall identify actions 
needed for “[r]esource protection, such as avoidance or mitigation of trespass, 
fire or insect damage.”285 RMPs must also include “general management prac-
tices and uses, including mitigating measures, identified to protect” areas de-
termined to be of critical environmental concern.286 And for mitigation 
measures that are adopted in RMPs, a plan for monitoring and evaluation must 
be included to “determine whether mitigation measures are satisfactory.”287 
BLM’s contemporaneous understanding demonstrates that the agency itself 
understood the Land Use Planning mandate to encompass at least some mitiga-
tion, and because the term mitigation in the context of environmental law had 
already come to mean avoidance, minimization, and compensation, the regula-
tions suggest that compensatory mitigation, in addition to avoidance measures, 
is a permissible land use planning tool.288 
By logical extension, the Land Use Planning Mandate also authorizes the 
BLM to require compensatory mitigation in implementation and project ap-
proval decisions. The BLM is authorized to “issue management decisions to 
implement land use plans,”289 and municipal land use agencies often impose 
                                                                                                                           
 282 ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 1, at 78–79. The table identifies potential 
zones that “could be used in public land administration” by agencies implementing the Planning Man-
date. Id. at 77. While the BLM may not have adopted those zoning classifications, the point remains 
that Congress understood that land use planning could incorporate mitigation requirements. 
 283 The now-overridden 2016 planning regulations contemplated that RMPs would address com-
pensatory mitigation. See Resource Management Planning, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580, 89,594 (Dec. 12, 
2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 1600) (“By including this definition [of mitigation] in the plan-
ning regulations, the BLM acknowledges that . . . [the mitigation hierarchy] also applies to the plan-
ning process.”); see also MCGARITY ET AL., supra note 122, at 20 (noting the Congressional Review 
Act overrode the 2016 planning rule). 
 284 Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,766. 
 285 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(m)(6)(i) (2019); see Public Lands and Resources; Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting, 44 Fed. Reg. at 46,393. 
 286 Public Lands and Resources; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, 44 Fed. Reg. at 46,393. 
 287 Id. at 46,398. 
 288 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 289 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e). 
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compensatory mitigation through permitting processes in addition to generally 
applicable zoning codes.290 
What would compensatory mitigation look like as part of the BLM’s land 
use planning process? In designating areas potentially available for oil leasing, 
for example, an RMP could require that leases and APDs issued for activities 
within the geographic extent of the plan include measures to offset impacts to 
particular resources, just as did the RMP amendments implementing the great-
er sage-grouse conservation plans.291 Such a requirement might necessarily be 
less specific than the type of tailored conditions that could be incorporated in 
later decisions related to identifiable and specific tracts of public lands. That is, 
however, a feature of all public lands management that establishes policies at 
higher levels of generality to provide direction for subsequent implementation 
decisions. 
D. Effectuating the Anti-Degradation Mandate 
Unlike FLPMA’s other mandates, the Anti-Degradation Mandate prefer-
ences environmental protection—at least to an extent—above other land uses, 
providing a third source of authority for compensatory mitigation require-
ments. It demands that the BLM “shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any 
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the land.”292 
This obligation is more encompassing than the Multiple Use and Land Use 
Planning Mandates, because it applies to all BLM decisions, including those 
related to hard rock mining. Yet it is also a more limited source of authority, 
because it does not authorize broad balancing among competing uses, but ra-
ther serves as a minimum standard of environmental protection. 
FLPMA does not define the phrase “unnecessary and undue degradation,” 
but if such degradation is threatened, section 302 is both obligatory and capa-
cious.293 The BLM must take “any action” necessary, a phrase included in the 
statute without qualification. By identifying “regulation” as one variety of ac-
tion, FLPMA indicates that the actions contemplated encompass administrative 
actions.294 Put differently, section 302 need not be read to require the BLM to 
                                                                                                                           
 290 See Pidot, supra note 62, at 137. 
 291 See Greater Sage-Grouse Finding, supra note 26, at 59,858. 
 292 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 293 Id.; see Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016) (“Unlike the 
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with specific enumeration.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 
129 (1991). Context can indicate to the contrary, but FLPMA generally concerns the management of 
public lands through processes governed by principles of administrative law and understanding the 
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send its employees into the field with picks and shovels to rectify environmen-
tal harms, but rather that the agency may avail itself of the apparatus of admin-
istrative law—rulemaking, adjudication, licenses, and the like—to prevent 
them. The BLM must, of course, proceed in a lawful fashion, placing some 
limitation on what could constitute permissible actions. It cannot, for example, 
violate constitutional rights in its efforts to protect public lands. But the BLM 
can—and for many years has—required compensatory mitigation through run-
of-the-mill administrative actions like issuing permits or other approvals.295 
Those actions comfortably fall within the universe of actions encompassed by 
section 302. 
The BLM must act, however, only if required to do so to prevent harms 
that are unnecessary or undue. Those two words—unnecessary and undue—
focus the BLM’s attention in different directions. The word undue addresses 
the severity of the impacts of a proposed use, and whether those impacts ex-
ceed a threshold rendering them unacceptable.296 The word unnecessary, on the 
other hand, addresses the need for impacts to occur as a component of an au-
thorized activity.297 This difference in meaning suggests that a finding that an 
impact is unnecessary should lend itself to modifying a proposed activity, be-
cause the impacts need not occur for the project to move forward, while a find-
ing that an impact is undue may require a bar to the activity altogether. 
Notwithstanding the breadth of section 302, it has received little attention 
in the courts, although those that have considered claims that the BLM has 
failed to fulfill the Anti-Degradation Mandate have generally viewed the agen-
cy as enjoying substantial discretion. In 2013 in Western Watersheds Project v. 
Abbey, for example, the Ninth Circuit explained that section 302 “does not 
mandate specific BLM action” and that the BLM has discretion “to choose 
                                                                                                                           
word “action” as the word is used in administrative law places sensible limits on the obligation im-
posed by section 302. Id. 
 295 The BLM’s regulations require hard rock miners to comply with “mitigation measures speci-
fied by BLM to protect public lands.” See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.420(a)(4) (2019). They must comply 
before engaging in any large-scale mining activities that require approval of a plan of operations. See 
id. § 3809.11(a). No definition of mitigation is provided, but in its preamble, the BLM suggested that 
its regulations were “necessary for the identification, prevention, or mitigation of environmental im-
pacts associated with mining.” See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Man-
agement, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,847 (Bureau of Land Mgmt. Oct. 30, 2001) (suggesting that the 
term mitigation encompasses more than merely avoiding or minimizing impacts). 
 296 See Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(inquiring as to whether the BLM “will implement sufficient measures to prevent degradation unnec-
essary to, or undue in proportion to, the development” being authorized); see also Undue, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 52 (“Excessive or unwarranted . . . .”). 
 297 See Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 n.13 (D. Utah 1979) (defining unnecessary im-
pacts in context of hard rock mining to mean “that which is not necessary for mining”); see also Un-
necessary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 52 (“Not required under the circumstances; not 
necessary.”). 
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appropriate measures.”298 In another leading case, the D.C. District Court in 
2003 in Mineral Policy Center v. Norton ruled that the BLM can choose 
whether to effectuate the Anti-Degradation Mandate through land use planning 
or through a case-by-case basis as it considers individual projects.299 
At the same time, experience suggests that the Anti-Degradation Mandate 
includes enforceable content. The Interior Department has taken conflicting 
views about the meaning of the mandate, which courts have reviewed and cor-
rected. Consistent with the statutory language, a 1999 Solicitor’s Opinion ex-
plained that the conjunctive “or” between the words “unnecessary” and “un-
due” meant that the BLM had both the power to address avoidable degrada-
tion, which would be unnecessary, and also to address unavoidable, but suffi-
ciently severe degradation, which would be undue.300 In 2001, the Department 
essentially abandoned that position, and interpreted the two words as “similar 
terms . . . or as equivalents,” with the result that it viewed itself as lacking au-
thority to prohibit hard rock mining (or other) activities with severe, irreducible 
impacts.301 The D.C. District Court in Mineral Policy Center rejected that inter-
pretation, explaining that the BLM must “prevent, not only unnecessary degra-
dation, but also degradation that, while necessary . . . is undue or excessive.”302 
 Compensatory mitigation could address either aspect of the Anti-
Degradation Mandate.303 An activity could have dramatic—i.e., undue—
environmental consequences in the absence of offsetting activity, and impacts 
may be deemed unnecessary where cost-effective compensatory mitigation 
exists, and where its implementation would not render a project uneconomic or 
impracticable.304 For example, construction of a phosphate mine could cause 
                                                                                                                           
 298 719 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 299 See 292 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 
 300 See Memorandum (M-36999) from Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to Sec’y et al., Dep’t of the 
Interior (Dec. 27, 1999) (“The conjunction ‘or’ between ‘unnecessary’ and ‘undue’ speaks of a Secre-
tarial authority to address separate types of degradation—that which is ‘unnecessary’ and that which is 
‘undue.’”). 
 301 See Memorandum (M-37007) from Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to Sec’y, Dep’t of the Inte-
rior (Oct. 23, 2001) (“We cannot automatically assume that the terms [unnecessary or undue] are 
disjunctive alternatives with entirely separate meanings.”). 
 302 292 F. Supp. 2d at 43. 
 303 For a compelling argument that the BLM can, and should, require users extracting fossil fuels 
from public lands to pay a carbon fee as compensatory mitigation for climate impacts, see Burger, 
supra note 10, at 317–18. 
 304 Even when viewed independently, “undue degradation” is susceptible to multiple meanings. It 
could mean degradation that is too severe, meeting the definition in BLM regulations promulgated in 
2000 (and amended shortly thereafter) prohibiting “substantial irreparable harm to significant re-
sources.” Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 
69,998, 70,001 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 2090, et al.). That formulation would 
appear to focus exclusively on environmental harm. Alternatively, environmental harm could be un-
due taking account both of its severity and the nature and importance of the activity that causes it. See 
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undue degradation if pollution emanating from it would make nearby water-
ways uninhabitable by aquatic species. Requiring the mining company to ad-
dress other sources of pollution in the watershed could address this undue deg-
radation. Alternately, if the mine degraded water quality to a lesser degree, but 
offsetting activities were inexpensive, the degradation would be unnecessary. 
In considering the mine, the BLM likely enjoys substantial discretion to assess 
the severity of harms and consider the cost of offsetting action to determine if 
threatened degradation is unnecessary or undue. If it concludes that such deg-
radation would occur, the BLM would have ample authority to determine 
whether to require the mine to address impacts through compensatory mitiga-
tion or through other means. 
The Anti-Degradation Mandate may, however, limit the BLM’s authority 
because it relates only to degradation of land. By extension, it may support 
only those measures needed to offset land impacts. To put this differently, other 
provisions of FLPMA enable the BLM to consider and manage conflicts 
among the panoply of uses of public lands, but the Anti-Degradation Mandate 
only targets the ill-effects of use on the public lands themselves. Many envi-
ronmental impacts have an adequate nexus to the land itself to qualify, but ar-
guments may exist about impacts to air or climate that are attenuated from the 
immediate public lands occupied. Would a use resulting in direct wildlife mor-
tality degrade the lands, for example, if a wind turbine killed birds in flight? 
Perhaps so, if the BLM could reasonably articulate the connection between 
birds killed by the turbine and the health of public lands.305 
E. Reconsidering the Disclaimer of Authority 
As explained in the Sections above, FLPMA’s history, structure, and lan-
guage support the BLM possessing three general authorities to require com-
pensatory mitigation. The BLM has recently taken a contrary view.306 Are 
those indicia sufficiently clear to overcome the deference courts afford to 
agencies interpreting the statutes they implement? This Section examines the 
BLM’s current policy and explains that its character is such that under existing 
administrative law doctrine it deserves little deference. Moreover, good argu-
ments exist that FLPMA unambiguously vests the BLM with authority to require 
                                                                                                                           
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 661 F.3d at 76 (explaining “the words ‘unnecessary’ and 
‘undue’ are modifiers requiring nouns to give them meaning, and by the plain terms of the statute, that 
noun in each case must be whatever actions are causing ‘degradation’”). 
 305 In a decision issued the same year as FLPMA’s enactment, the Supreme Court recognized the 
interconnection between animal communities and the ecology of public lands in the context of inter-
preting the scope of Congress’s Property Clause authority. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 
535 (1976). 
 306 See Dec. 2018 Modified Memorandum, supra note 29; Pidot, supra note 29, at 7–8. 
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compensatory mitigation, even if the agency retains substantial discretion to de-
cide whether, how, and in what circumstances it will exercise that authority. 
The BLM has not engaged in notice and comment rulemaking to issue 
regulations to address compensatory mitigation that would be owed deference 
under the familiar two-step framework established by the Supreme Court in 
1984 in Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Research Defense Council, Inc.307 Instead, 
it expressed its current view disclaiming authority in an instruction memoran-
dum directing BLM employees “not [to] require compensatory mitigation from 
public land users” and simply asserting that FLPMA “cannot reasonably be 
read to allow BLM to require mandatory compensatory mitigation for potential 
temporary or permanent impacts from activities authorized on public lands.”308 
The Department of the Interior has made clear that instruction memorandums 
“do not have the force and effect of law,”309 and they are not issued through the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.310 Therefore, the instruction memo-
randum should not be afforded Chevron deference.311 
Nonetheless, a court might defer to the instruction memorandum “propor-
tional to its ‘power to persuade’” under so-called Skidmore deference,312 taking 
account of “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
                                                                                                                           
 307 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Nonetheless, because the BLM has explicitly adopted a policy, its 
disclaimer of authority does not constitute an unreviewable action immunized from judicial review. 
Cf. Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek: What Agencies Can (and Can’t) Do 
to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2011) (discussing strategies agencies deploy to 
insulate their decisions from judicial review). Justiciability considerations like standing and ripeness 
could impede efforts to directly seek judicial review of the instruction memoranda through which 
BLM announced its disclaimer of authority. The BLM has, however, already taken concrete action 
based on these memoranda, for example, by amending resource management plans to remove com-
pensatory mitigation obligations. See, e.g., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 31, at 1-4. 
 308 See July 2018 Instruction Memorandum, supra note 29; Dec. 2018 Modified Memorandum, 
supra note 29. The policies also provide that even if the BLM has authority to require compensatory 
mitigation, it will not do so. July 2018 Instruction Memorandum, supra; Dec. 2018 Modified Memo-
randum, supra. 
 309 Robert S. Glenn & DeLoyd Cazier, 124 Interior Dec. 104, 109 (IBLA 1992); see McMaster v. 
United States, 731 F.3d 881, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2013) (relying on the IBLA’s decision in Robert S. 
Glenn & DeLoyd Cazier to hold that the BLM Manual was not binding). 
 310 Because the Instruction Memorandum was not issued through notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing but nonetheless “is written in binding terms,” it may be entirely invalid. See W. Watersheds Pro-
ject v. Zinke, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1234 (D. Idaho 2018) (ruling that the instruction memorandum 
was unlawful). 
 311 See McMaster, 731 F.3d at 891 (declining to give Chevron deference to the Solicitor’s Opin-
ion because it lacked the force of law); S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 
735, 759 (10th Cir. 2005) (declining to afford Chevron deference to BLM’s interpretation that had 
“never been adopted by the agency through a formal rule or regulation and do[es] not have the force 
of law”); W. Watersheds Project, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 n.9 (declining to afford Chevron deference 
to instruction memorandum). 
 312 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and [other] 
factors.”313 None of those factors weigh in favor of deference here: the instruc-
tion memorandum contains scant analysis to bolster its interpretation, what 
little reasoning it provides is based on an incorrect reading of caselaw, and its 
ultimate view is inconsistent with long-standing practice.314 A court asked to-
day to address the BLM’s authority to require compensatory mitigation under 
FLPMA would, therefore, find little guidance from the agency and should re-
ject its crabbed view of its statutory authority for the reasons explained in this 
Article. 
Future administrative action could shift the terrain, should the BLM 
promulgate regulations based on its current view, presenting the question 
whether FLPMA is unambiguous, and if not, whether the BLM can reasonably 
construe the statute as prohibiting compensatory mitigation. This is a decidedly 
harder question, as the statutory text does not expressly address compensatory 
mitigation.315 Nonetheless, as this Part has demonstrated, the text, structure, 
and history of the statute provide compelling evidence that compensatory miti-
gation is plainly authorized.316 
The Anti-Degradation Mandate would appear the strongest source of au-
thority. It charges the BLM with taking “any action” to prevent prohibited deg-
radation,317 and although that phrase is not precise, it is unmistakably broad. 
Few words would appear to encompass broader authority than those that Con-
gress chose. As a result, the BLM would be hard pressed to provide a satisfac-
tory explanation as to why compensatory mitigation is not authorized by the 
Anti-Degradation Mandate. 
The Land Use Planning Mandate should also be viewed as unambiguous-
ly authorizing compensatory mitigation, at least as a component of RMPs. 
Land use planning encompasses compensatory mitigation through the instru-
ment of exactions. It did so in 1976, and it does so today. In the absence of tex-
tual signals to the contrary, none of which exist, FLPMA should be read to vest 
the BLM with authority to use familiar and traditional planning tools. 
                                                                                                                           
 313 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
 314 See Pidot, supra note 29, at 11–18. 
 315 In addition to the hurdles imposed by Chevron deference, the BLM would have to adequately 
explain its change in position. As Professor Bill Buzbee has explained, simply identifying ambiguity 
is often insufficient to sustain a dramatic change in agency position because “[b]road claims of policy 
change power also tend to downplay the regulatory centrality of science, data, other empirical obser-
vations and predictions about the world, and linked agency explanations.” William W. Buzbee, The 
Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1360 
(2018). 
 316 See supra Part III.B-D. 
 317 43 U.S.C § 1732(b). 
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The Multiple Use Mandate presents, perhaps, the closest question. The 
BLM must manage public lands under its principles, but those principles do 
not clearly address the terms and conditions that the BLM may incorporate 
into land use authorizations. Courts have, however, often accepted arguments 
made by the United States that the Multiple Use Mandate imbues the BLM 
with broad discretion and authority over public lands and land use authoriza-
tions.318 Where the BLM has successfully invoked the breadth of its authority 
to defend itself in lawsuits seeking to compel it to manage public lands in a 
particular fashion, the agency should not be able to disclaim authority under a 
narrow reading of the statute. 
IV. EFFICACY OF COMPENSATORY MITIGATION ON PUBLIC LANDS 
Even if the BLM has ample authority to require compensatory mitigation, 
should it? In short, sometimes. Done well, compensatory mitigation can broker 
compromise, enhance efficiency, and ensure that future generations inherit 
healthy and vibrant public lands. Done poorly, it can deliver an empty promise 
of environmental protection that wastes resources on futile conservation efforts 
or, worse yet, serves as justification for the destruction of unique and irre-
placeable resources. This Part identifies four considerations to guide compen-
satory mitigation requirements on public lands.319 
Before articulating those considerations, consider the potential benefits 
that compensatory mitigation offers, if designed carefully and deployed in ap-
propriate circumstances. First, compensatory mitigation creates flexibility for 
land managers, expanding the universe of possible decisions beyond a binary 
choice to either authorize an activity or forbid it.320 In its absence, the BLM 
faces a constrained set of options. On the one hand, it can authorize an activity 
and allow harms to the environment and other resource users to occur, satisfy-
ing the demand of the party seeking the authorization and allied interests. On 
the other, it can prohibit the activity, frustrate the interests of a project propo-
nent, and forgo the public benefits a project would produce, but preserve con-
                                                                                                                           
 318 See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 1092, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he BLM’s wide authority to ‘manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sus-
tained yield’. . . allows it ample discretion for management of lands with wilderness values.”); Theo-
dore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship, 616 F.3d at 518 (“[BLM] has wide discretion to determine how 
those [multiple use] principles should be applied.”); see also Strickland, 519 F.2d at 469 (multiple use 
management under the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964 “breathe[s] discretion at every 
pore”). 
 319 See infra notes 320–391 and accompanying text. 
 320 See Baker et al., supra note 35, at 10,333 (describing mitigation programs as injecting flexibil-
ity into rigid regulatory regimes); Owen, supra note 22, at 271 (“[B]y replacing flat prohibitions with 
the possibility of deal-making, compensatory mitigation appears to give flexibility to regulated enti-
ties.”). 
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ditions on the lands that meet the needs of other interests. Compensatory miti-
gation enables decisions that meet a broader range of social needs, advancing 
core values of the Multiple Use Mandate.321 
Second, and relatedly, compensatory mitigation brokers compromise. In 
the short term, it can reduce public opposition to specific resource develop-
ment projects, by linking development to the implementation of conservation 
activities.322 Over the longer term, compensatory mitigation can facilitate col-
laboration among disparate interests in public lands, building trust and under-
standing that can inspire innovation and build partnerships across historic di-
vides.323 In an era in which public land disputes have sparked heated protest 
and even armed resistance,324 the ability of compensatory mitigation to provide 
opportunities to build common ground is an independent benefit of the tool. 
Third, compensatory mitigation, if carefully planned and coordinated 
across ecosystems, can lead to better environmental outcomes, by directing 
resources to conservation activities where they are most needed.325 All ecosys-
tems experience the effects of human activities, a dynamic that will only accel-
erate with climate change.326 Coupling compensatory mitigation with effective 
land use planning can channel intensive land uses into areas of less ecological 
importance and create financial resources for the restoration and protection of 
more vital areas. 
                                                                                                                           
 321 See Gregory S. Braker et al., Environmental Mitigation in Mining: Unique Challenges and 
Opportunities, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 25, 27 (2013) (arguing in favor of broader compensato-
ry mitigation requirements in lieu of avoidance and minimization efforts because “[v]aluable minerals 
should be efficiently extracted, not left in the ground”). 
 322 See id. at 25 (“For surface mining permit applicants, the task is to formulate a plan to maxim-
ize the recovery of minable resources while minimizing adverse impacts to environmental resources to 
a level that is acceptable to regulators and, ideally, to local and environmental groups.”). 
 323 This may sound Panglossian, but in some contexts compensatory mitigation has already 
brought together the business and environmental community. For example, the Nature Conservancy 
has developed a forecasting methodology to facilitate trading of conservation credits in sagebrush 
country. See Roger Moellendorf & Brian Bahouth, A Look at the Nature Conservancy’s Landscape 
Conservation Forecasting Program, NEV. CAP. NEWS (Feb. 7, 2019), https://nevadacapitalnews.org/
2019/02/07/a-look-at-the-nature-conservancys-landscape-conservation-forecasting-program/ [https://
perma.cc/H22B-EZT6]. A large mining company relied upon the methodology in entering a conserva-
tion agreement with the Department of the Interior. See Protecting Sagebrush Ecosystems: Working 
with Barrick to Protecting Sagebrush Seas, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/en-
us/about-us/where-we-work/united-states/nevada/stories-in-nevada/barrick-gold-corporation-and-the-
nature-conservancy [https://perma.cc/8UGG-8M6J]; see also Pidot, supra note 27, at 191. 
 324 See Kirk Johnson, Siege Has Ended, but Battle Over Public Lands Rages on, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/14/us/public-lands-bundy-malheur-national-wildlife-
refuge.html [https://perma.cc/6TUJ-8S4D]. 
 325 See Robert L. Glicksman, Regulatory Safeguards for Accountable Ecosystem Service Markets 
in Wetlands Development, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 943, 943 (2014). 
 326 See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 42 ENVTL. L. 313, 325–32 
(2012) (discussing the threat posed by climate change to naturalness and wildness of wilderness areas). 
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Fourth, compensatory mitigation can improve economic efficiency. In its 
absence, the environmental harm caused by resource development remains an 
economic externality, leading to overproduction.327 Compensatory mitigation 
serves as a market corrective, forcing resource users to internalize the full 
costs—or at least a fuller accounting of the costs—associated with their activi-
ties, including both purely ecological harms and economic losses resulting 
from diminished ecosystem services.328 Moreover, deployed effectively, com-
pensatory mitigation recognizes that healthy ecosystems on public lands them-
selves produce economic value, and that environmental protection may en-
hance, rather than impede, the economic value of these lands.329 
Fifth, compensatory mitigation creates a price signal that can spur in-
vestment in new technologies and techniques that enable resource use with 
fewer environmental impacts.330 To the extent that compensatory mitigation 
encompasses credit trading schemes, it can also serve to direct conservation 
resources to those locations where benefits can be obtained at the lowest 
cost.331 In turn, the business opportunities presented by compensatory mitiga-
tion have the potential to create new constituencies for environmental protec-
tion. This will occur if, for example, tradeable credit systems are developed, as 
has occurred in the wetland mitigation program, where private for-profit busi-
ness enterprises create wetlands mitigation banks to produce and sell credits 
generated by preserving, restoring, or enhancing wetlands.332 Transforming 
environmental protection into an opportunity for private entrepreneurship of-
fers advantages, including by harnessing a substantial flow of capital—the in-
vestment of just a single private equity firm exceeded $300 million in capital 
commitments in 2016.333 Privatizing mitigation may also provide an array of 
benefits often promised by market-based solutions, impelling innovation and 
enhancing efficiency. At the same time, privatization raises concerns about 
accountability, transparency, and public participation, and the interests of the 
                                                                                                                           
 327 See Hein, supra note 69, at 19. 
 328 See Ruhl et al., supra note 77, at 256 (noting that, in the absence of government intervention, 
“a landowner’s decision about whether to convert wetlands to other uses is unlikely to take into ac-
count their service value to others”). Professors J.B. Ruhl and Jim Salzman and their collaborator Iris 
Goodman note that wetlands mitigation historically “was primarily biocentric in focus” and neglected 
ecosystem services, but that accounting for ecoservices can comfortably fit within compensatory miti-
gation. Id. at 255. 
 329 See, e.g., Glicksman, supra note 325, at 947–48. See generally James Salzman et al., Protect-
ing Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001). 
 330 See Spanjer, supra note 23, at 382–87. 
 331 Braker et al., supra note 321, at 27–28 (“[C]ompared with well-planned watershed and eco-
region based mitigation, onsite avoidance and minimization may offer fewer ecological benefits to the 
relevant ecological units . . . .”). 
 332 See Owley, supra note 23, at 1110. 
 333 See Spanjer, supra note 23, at 374. 
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political constituency it creates in profitability may impede effective regulation 
to ensure the long-term success of mitigation projects.334 
Sixth, to the extent that compensatory mitigation requirements are em-
bedded in land use plans, agency guidance, or regulations, they enhance busi-
ness certainty by providing clarity about the measures a resource user must 
implement to address environmental impacts.335 Although the BLM can, of 
course, always revise (or entirely abandon) such decisions, they have greater 
durability than other land use decisions because they draw support from across 
the spectrum of interests, as evidenced by a letter signed by an extraordinarily 
broad array of interests in Wyoming—representing oil and gas, mining, ranch-
ing, farming, and environmentalists—urging the Trump Administration to 
leave sage-grouse conservation efforts embedded in RMPs largely intact.336 
Those are attractive benefits. Yet they will only result from well-designed, 
appropriate compensatory mitigation requirements. The remainder of this Part 
identifies four considerations that should guide assessment of whether and how 
compensatory mitigation should be required in a particular context.337 
A. Recognizing Limitations 
Some harms cannot be offset or cannot be offset effectively. Where a use 
of public lands involves such harms, purporting to require compensatory miti-
gation that is destined to fail may erode public trust, alienate resource users, 
and conceal from public scrutiny the very real and potentially irreversible ef-
fects of a resource use, serving as a false justification for authorizing the ac-
tivity.338 Compensatory mitigation should not be relied upon in such circum-
stances. 
This dark side to compensatory mitigation may occur because a resource 
is unique.339 Sacred lands provide a quintessential example. Take, for example, 
                                                                                                                           
 334 See Glicksman, supra note 325, at 960–93; Owley, supra note 23, at 1118–23. 
 335 See Burger, supra note 10, at 340; Pidot, supra note 27, at 180–83. 
 336 See Letter from Paul Ulrich, Petroleum Ass’n of Wyo. et al., to Erica Husse, Bureau of Land 
Mgmt. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/12/01/document_gw_03.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K297-Z3KL]; see also Scott Streater, Sage Grouse: Wyo. Industry, Conservation Groups 
See Hope in Federal Plans, GREENWIRE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://bit.ly/2vXm08z [https://perma.cc/
U6WB-BPXW]. 
 337 See infra notes 338–391 and accompanying text. 
 338 This risk amounts to the potential that compensatory mitigation could be deployed to “green-
wash” projects, rather than provide meaningful environmental benefits. See Miriam A. Cherry, The 
Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
281, 286 (2014) (describing “greenwashing as a type of distraction, or diversionary tactic”). 
 339 To some extent, nature can always be viewed as unique. Every hill and vale has its own indi-
vidual characteristics and every individual animal its own history, genetic composition, and desires. 
See David Takacs, Are Koalas Fungible? Biodiversity Offsetting and the Law, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
161, 165 (2018). To draw on an example offered by Professor David Takacs, a system for offsetting 
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the four sacred peaks of the Navajo. As Professor Kristen Carpenter explains, 
“[f]rom the time of their creation, the Navajo people have had a spiritual obli-
gation to stay within their homeland, care for it, and revere their sacred moun-
tains. Accordingly, the Peaks are greeted with daily prayer songs referencing 
the mountain as ‘mother’ and ‘leader.’”340 The harm caused by allowing min-
ing of these peaks could not be offset by restoring other nearby mountains. 
Development that will destroy the only remaining habitat for an endangered 
species—a project, for example, that would destroy Devil’s Hole, the only 
known location of a species of desert pup fish—would similarly not be suscep-
tible to compensation.341 
Other resources are difficult, but not conceptually impossible, to recreate, 
and to the extent we lack the technical capacity to effectively offset such 
harms, compensatory mitigation will fail. To sort among resources for which 
compensatory mitigation is appropriate and those for which it is not, requires 
careful, clear-eyed analysis of the environmental attributes at stake at a project 
site and a similarly careful evaluation of available technology. For example, a 
scientific review of the wetlands mitigation program found that efforts to cre-
ate or restore certain types of wetlands—fens and bogs, for example—
generally fail.342 Because tools do not currently exist to recreate the complex 
ecological interactions that make them up, a decision authorizing the destruc-
tion of a fen or bog will result in a loss of those ecosystems and the services 
they provide. Decisionmakers should not conceal the consequences of their 
decisions though the artifice of sham mitigation projects. 
Gaps in scientific knowledge—both theoretical and applied—also create 
limits on what compensatory mitigation can accomplish. Some biological sys-
tems and ecological interactions have been extensively studied, creating oppor-
tunities for better calibrated, more successful efforts to offset impacts. For ex-
ample, loss of milkweed has contributed to the decline of monarch butterflies, 
and increasing the numbers of those plants in areas frequented by the butterfly 
constitutes an important component of conservation efforts.343 Protocols have 
                                                                                                                           
harms to biodiversity offers no succor for “koalas peaceably munching eucalyptus leaves” who will 
have their habitat destroyed, and possibly lives ended, by a pipeline project. Id. Even in the absence of 
perfect substitution, however, mitigation may meaningfully compensate for certain losses, but not 
others, depending upon what values adhere to the resources harmed. 
 340 Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Personhood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 352 (2008). 
 341 See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 132 (1976) (affirming an injunction to protect 
Devil’s Hole and finding federal reserved water rights for pupfish conservation). 
 342 This observation mirrors the experience in the wetlands mitigation context, where the National 
Resource Council identified “wetlands that are difficult or impossible to restore, such as fens or bogs.” 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 7. 
 343 See Thomas D. Landis & R. Kasten Dumroese, Propagating Native Milkweeds for Restoring 
Monarch Butterfly Habitat, in INT’L PLANT PROPAGATORS’ SOC’Y, COMBINED PROCEEDINGS 299, 
299 (2014) (“[G]rowing and outplanting milkweeds is a simple and easy way to assist this beloved 
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been developed for propagating numerous native milkweed species.344 The 
U.S. Forest Service already engages in extensive efforts to spread milkweed 
across hundreds of thousands of acres of national forest,345 and similar efforts 
could be deployed to offset activities in areas of public lands rich in those 
plants.346 Less knowledge exists about other habitats, ecological systems, and 
biological interconnections.347 For example, little is known about threats to the 
Palouse giant earthworm, or even its distribution in the wild, which has been 
rarely seen.348 Developing effective compensatory mitigation for a little under-
stood species, who may not even exist in a project area, would be difficult. 
Merely attempting to conduct a survey for the worm in a project area could be 
expensive and time consuming. Where such costs dwarf the uncertain benefits 
produced by a project at the edge of science, compensatory mitigation may not 
be appropriate. 
Moreover, uncertainty will also exist about more practical aspects of a 
project. Sometimes it is difficult to predict how an authorized activity will af-
fect the environment within which it occurs. This could result from a lack of 
experience with newer technologies or deployment of an old technology in a 
new setting. Researchers have decades of experience studying the impacts of 
oil and gas development in public lands, while deployment of utility-scale 
wind and solar energy generation facilities is a much more recent occurrence 
with less information available about impacts.349 Land managers may also 
have an incomplete understanding of the resources present at a project site. 
The result of such uncertainty played out in public view after the BLM ap-
                                                                                                                           
butterfly.”); see also Stanley Z. Guffy et al., Management of Isolated Populations: Southern Strain 
Brook Trout, in ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IL-
LUSTRATED BY A REGIONAL BIOSPHERE RESERVE COOPERATIVE 247, 248 (John D. Peine ed., 1998) 
(describing extensive research about brook trout habitat in the southern Appalachian mountains and 
the causes of their decline). 
 344 See Landis & Dumroese, supra note 343, at 300. 
 345 Priya C. Shahani et al., Monarch Habitat Conservation Across North America: Past Progress 
and Future Needs, in MONARCHS IN A CHANGING WORLD: BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF AN 
ICONIC BUTTERFLY 31, 37 (Karen S. Oberhauser et al. eds., 2015). 
 346 Id. 
 347 See, e.g., Morris & Owley, supra note 16, at 383 (“One of the critical problems with develop-
ing mitigation . . . in the California desert is that, compared to many other areas, there is relatively 
little understanding of where species may be located and how desert ecosystems function.”). 
 348 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on a Petition to List 
the Giant Palouse Earthworm (Drilolerius americanus) as Threatened or Endangered, 76 Fed. Reg. 
44,547, 44,549–51 (Dep’t of the Interior July 26, 2011) (listing 10 instances of confirmed identifica-
tion of species); Ryan P. Kelly et al., Science, Policy, and Data-Driven Decisions in a Data Vacuum, 
44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 7, 21–22 (2017). 
 349 See WYO. GAME & FISH DEP’T, 2017 STATE WILDLIFE ACTION PLAN, at II-2-6 (2017) (“For 
. . . species of wildlife that inhabit open landscapes, such as pronghorn and sage-grouse, the behavior 
and resulting population responses to wind energy development are currently unknown but being 
studied.”). 
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proved the Ivanpah Solar Project and it became apparent that far more desert 
tortoises lived at the project site than had been estimated.350 
Recognizing that some resources are unique, others are difficult to repli-
cate, and that there is uncertainty inherent in any conservation effort does not 
undermine the benefits that can flow from compensatory mitigation. Land 
managers always make decisions based on imperfect information, and com-
pensatory mitigation is no different.351 Moreover, these dynamics do not mean 
that land managers should always eschew experimentation with innovative but 
unproven techniques,352 or attempt to develop new scientific information about 
the ecological systems on public lands as a component of compensatory miti-
gation.353 Experiments have value. They produce knowledge that can result in 
new, better methods of environmental restoration.354 Yet, when public land 
managers pursue compensatory mitigation at the outer boundary of current 
knowledge and technical capacity, it is incumbent upon them to do so candidly 
so that the party tasked with implementing compensatory mitigation and the 
public understand the risks. 
B. Accounting for Differences 
Even among environmental impacts that are amenable to offsetting, sub-
stantial differences exist that require variation in the design of compensatory 
mitigation. This is particularly so because the public lands contain a diverse 
array of values and uses, meaning that compensatory mitigation on public 
lands could be far broader than the wetlands mitigation and habitat mitigation 
programs, each of which address a single (if complicated) environmental 
harm.355 The BLM must carefully account for these differences and should not 
blindly deploy a mitigation scheme developed in one context in another. 
The most important difference among potential compensatory mitigation 
activities is the complexity of the harm at issue. Many environmental problems 
                                                                                                                           
 350 See Morris & Owley, supra note 16, at 383; Ken Wells, Tortoises Manhandled for Solar Splits 
Environmentalists, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2012), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-
09-20/tortoises-manhandled-for-solar-splits-environmentalists [https://perma.cc/58V9-TNLL]. 
 351 See Justin R. Pidot, Governance and Uncertainty, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 125–26 (2015) 
(discussing uncertainty in natural resources decision making). 
 352 See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 
1464 (2011) (describing “adaptive management” as including “iterative decisionmaking and a com-
mitment to learning over time”). 
 353 See Pidot, supra note 27, at 192 (describing “pilot programs” as a component of public-private 
conservation agreement). 
 354 Pidot, supra note 351, at 160–61 (discussing knowledge produced through adaptive manage-
ment). 
 355 See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying text. 
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involve complex, far-flung interactions.356 Complex harms will need complex 
solutions, often requiring extensive planning to coordinate both authorized us-
es and mitigation efforts across landscapes.357 
Conservation of the greater sage-grouse is a paradigmatic example. A host 
of factors contribute to the decline of the species—development of habitat, 
increased wildfire, spread of invasive plant species, intensive grazing—and 
these threats occur throughout hundreds of thousands of acres of sagebrush 
steppe in the western United States, more than half of which occur on public 
lands and national forests.358 It is difficult to measure the adverse impact of 
any one land use, in isolation, and piecemeal compensatory mitigation efforts 
designed on a project-by-project basis may be poorly calibrated to successfully 
offset impacts to the bird.359 Rather, planning and coordination across federal 
lands will lead to more successful, less costly, and more predictable conserva-
tion efforts, and as the lengthy, resource-intensive process for developing the 
greater sage-grouse conservation plans demonstrates, this requires sustained 
attention, considerable investment, and collaboration by federal land managers, 
state wildlife agencies, and businesses.360 Although the BLM has engaged in 
this type of planning in a few instances, like the greater sage-grouse conserva-
tion plans and the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan, it has often 
implemented compensatory mitigation in an ad hoc fashion without sufficient 
regard for the manner by which land uses fit into the ecological systems within 
which they occur.361 
                                                                                                                           
 356 See Braker et al., supra note 321, at 27 (“When considering [wetlands] mitigation for mining, 
it is important to keep in mind that the policy and scientific underpinning of CWA mitigation is to 
improve water quality through a regional watershed approach.”). 
 357 For a discussion of the role of state-based planning efforts to guide habitat and wetlands miti-
gation, see Jessica B. Wilkinson & Robert Bendick, The Next Generation of Mitigation: Advancing 
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 358 See Greater Sage-Grouse Finding, supra note 26, at 59,866. 
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 360 Although the Department of the Interior has withdrawn the prior administration’s landscape 
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 361 For many years, the wetlands mitigation program similarly relied on individual mitigation 
projects undertaken by permit recipients. These atomized efforts have been widely criticized as “poor-
ly designed, inadequately implemented, and infrequently monitored.” Ruhl et al., supra note 77, at 
254; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 6–8; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
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Other harms may lend themselves to simpler solutions developed for a 
specific proposed land use. Consider two examples. Desert bighorn sheep in 
and around the Kofa National Wildlife Refuge of Arizona experienced a pre-
cipitous decline between 2006 and 2010, attributed largely to a prolonged 
drought in the area.362 Had a company sought permission to build a mine near 
the refuge that would disrupt or destroy a watering hole for the sheep, simple 
techniques could be used to construct an alternate water source nearby.363 Of 
similar simplicity were impacts to lands with wilderness characteristics caused 
by construction of high-voltage transmission lines as part of the TransWest 
Express project.364 Lands with wilderness characteristics must include at least 
5,000 acres of contiguous, undeveloped lands.365 To offset harms to wilderness 
characteristics, the BLM required the project sponsor to “acquire[] inholdings 
(either via conservation easement or fee-simple ownership) from willing 
sellers in designated wilderness (first priority) or wilderness study areas (sec-
ond priority) or lands managed to protect wilderness characteristics under a[] 
[resource management plan] (third priority) within the states with units im-
pacted by the Project.”366 These types of compensatory mitigation efforts do 
not require extensive coordination and planning to succeed. Establishing miti-
gation goals at a broader scale would still provide benefits, by enhancing pre-
dictability and consistency, but the BLM has limited resources to engage in 
such efforts, and the inability to do so for impacts that can effectively be offset 
on a project-by-project basis should not obstruct development of project-
specific requirements. 
Finally, effective compensatory mitigation requires attention to the nu-
ances of the affected ecological processes. Not every acre of sage brush steppe, 
mountain vale, or desert is the same.367 Because compensatory mitigation re-
quires measuring harms and offsetting benefits, it can lend itself to rote quanti-
fication—for example, assessing mitigation purely by counting the acreage 
                                                                                                                           
WETLANDS PROTECTION: CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT AP-
PROACH TO ENSURE THAT COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS OCCURRING 5–6 (2005). 
 362 See Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 363 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service created two such water sources that became the source of 
litigation because they occurred within designated wilderness. Id. 
 364 See TRANSWEST EXPRESS ROD, supra note 118, at 1. 
 365 See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2018); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 625 F.3d 
1092, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the BLM has the obligation to inventory and consider 
lands with wilderness characteristics outside of designated wilderness study areas). 
 366 TRANSWEST EXPRESS APPENDIX, supra note 118, at F-21. 
 367 See Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 50 (“Wetlands miti-
gation schemes assume that wetlands are fungible, yet ecological complexity calls into question this 
assumption.”). 
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degraded and improved.368 Substantial incentives may favor simplistic quanti-
fication, because it takes time and resources to complete the subtle and com-
plex analysis of truly accounting for ecological functions.369 Yet failing to rec-
ognize these differences, or taking a blinkered view to the harms threatened by 
an activity, could cause compensatory mitigation to obscure environmental 
harms, rather than serve as a corrective for them, creating the appearance on 
paper that the environment will be protected while resulting in significant harm 
in reality. This has occurred in the wetlands mitigation program, which largely 
adopted a simplistic quantification approach for many years, and was widely 
criticized for it.370 Regulatory changes in 2008 adopted a more qualitative ap-
proach focused on assessing and replacing ecosystem function, rather than raw 
acreage.371 Even under the new regulations, wetlands mitigation efforts have 
failed to account for all of the roles that wetlands play—such as flood protec-
tion and groundwater recharge—leading to neglect of urban wetlands, which 
often provide those services but have less value as habitat.372 The BLM would 
be wise to heed this lesson else its compensatory mitigation efforts will face 
scathing scrutiny from the public and scientific community.373 
C. Assuring Long-Term Implementation 
Development on public lands will often permanently reshape the envi-
ronment, causing impacts that stretch well into the future.374 Meaningful com-
                                                                                                                           
 368 Cf. Cynthia R. Harris & James M. McElfish, Jr., Natural Resource Damages, Mitigation 
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pensation for such impacts must occur across a concomitant timescale, requir-
ing ongoing monitoring, adaptation, and enforcement.375 
Even well-designed compensatory mitigation can fail at its inception, be-
cause resource users do not live up to their obligations through neglect or 
fraud.376 The first phase of conservation efforts—say removing an invasive 
plant and establishing native vegetation—can require sustained efforts over the 
course of years. In a 2001 report, the National Research Council found that 
“[u]p to 20 years may be needed for some wetland restoration or creation sites 
to achieve functional goals.”377 After that, restoration efforts can falter be-
cause, say, invasive plants reestablish themselves, requiring an ongoing in-
vestment of time and resources. The need for ongoing monitoring will be clear 
for many compensatory mitigation efforts, yet a 2005 Government Accounta-
bility Office report found that only about half of those required to engage in 
wetlands mitigation as a condition of securing a permit from the Army Corps 
of Engineers were required to engage in any monitoring whatsoever, and even 
if such an obligation existed, less than a quarter of those subject to it com-
plied.378 
Moreover, implementation is not by itself enough, because a well-designed 
mitigation project can confront unforeseen or changing circumstances that im-
pair its effectiveness.379 Contingency or adaptive management provisions can 
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after the mine is closed”). Yet reclamation efforts often fail and rarely restore ecosystem functions 
even approximating those that were lost. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, COAL MINE 
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 377 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 6. 
 378 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 361, at 5. 
 379 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 8 (recommending that wetlands miti-
gation projects receive long-term stewardship); Royal C. Gardner et al., Compensating for Wetland 
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ameliorate this concern,380 but designing and implementing provisions account-
ing for dynamic change also requires further investment of resources by public 
land managers and the resource users carrying out conservation activities.381 
The extent to which compensatory mitigation must include monitoring, 
maintenance, and adaptability to achieve success will depend on the nature of 
the project at issue and the harms subject to offset. As discussed above, creat-
ing a replacement water source for desert bighorn sheep or removing fencing 
to provide an alternative migratory pathway for pronghorn antelope may be 
technically simple and speedy, and require relatively little ongoing oversight. 
Restoring native plants in habitat occupied by invasive species, on the other 
hand, may require repeated efforts over many years. 
Compensatory mitigation often requires long-term monitoring and adap-
tation to succeed. It also requires enforcement in the eventuality that a project 
sponsor has shirked her obligations. Enforcement presents a thorny problem. 
In other environmental law contexts, citizen groups can supplement federal 
enforcement resources by suing those that violate legal requirements.382 Public 
land law in general, and FLPMA in particular, does not include similar citizen 
suit provisions, limiting the ability of the environmental community and the 
public to compel compliance with compensatory mitigation. Litigation can 
occur to challenge land management decisions under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, but it too cannot enforce mitigation measures after projects 
have been approved.383 As a result, enforcement lies in the hands of the federal 
government, which may lack the resources or appetite to bring such suits.384 
D. Pursuing Fairness, Consistency, and Predictability 
Fairness also matters.385 Even where resource users lack a legal entitle-
ment to engage in land uses, reasonable expectations exist about what will be 
required of them to undertake a desired land use.386 Compensatory mitigation 
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has not, however, attended to fairness. As former Interior Deputy Secretary 
David Hayes explained: 
While systems are in place to measure and address wetlands and 
some endangered species impacts, other types of environmental im-
pacts are dealt with on an ad hoc basis, or not at all. The result is 
that mitigation often is piecemealed, with project proponents re-
sponding to a set of varied and unpredictable requests from agencies 
that may or may not generate meaningful environmental benefits.387 
The expectations of resource users need not dominate evaluation of 
whether and to what extent compensatory mitigation is appropriate in a specif-
ic context. Perceptions of fair treatment are important, however, and the BLM 
should strive to treat similarly situated parties similarly. Failing to do so will 
generate public opposition and recalcitrance.388 Because compensatory mitiga-
tion often requires the long-term cooperation of resource users, perceptions of 
unfair treatment may substantially impair the efficacy of projects and the polit-
ical appetite for this management tool. 
Consistency and predictability also produce concrete economic benefits 
by enhancing certainty for the business community.389 This both pays direct 
dividends for the economy and local communities that rely on public lands 
resources and can also transform interest groups who typically oppose more 
stringent environmental protection into supporters of compensatory mitigation. 
For example, former Wyoming Governor Matt Meade strenuously defended 
the greater sage-grouse conservation plans because “[m]ineral companies need 
long-term predictability as they decide where to put capital.”390 Put differently, 
the business community may accept the increased costs posed by compensato-
ry mitigation requirements to the extent that those costs are sufficiently certain. 
The value of certainty and predictability militates in favor of developing 
compensatory mitigation policies through planning or general implementation 
decisions, rather than at the final stage of a project approval, where possible. 
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Consider again the numerous administrative steps required to authorize oil 
drilling on public lands—amending an RMP, allowing exploration, leasing, 
and authorizing drilling.391 Embedding mitigation measures in land use plans, 
or lease offerings, will enhance fairness and consistency. 
CONCLUSION 
Compensatory mitigation is a vital component of many federal environ-
mental programs and has been used broadly by land use planning agencies to 
address externalities connected to permitted activities. This common-sense 
approach that requires actors to address the harms they cause comfortably fits 
within the authority that FLPMA delegates to the BLM. Recognizing the 
BLM’s authority does not, by itself, solve use conflicts on public lands. Ques-
tions and controversy will remain about when compensatory mitigation is ap-
propriate, and to what extent. It is, however, an important start. Once the BLM 
recognizes the possibility of requiring compensatory mitigation, it can commit 
itself to the task of establishing a fair, consistent, and effective compensatory 
mitigation program. 
Moreover, the concept of compensatory mitigation could be deployed be-
yond its traditional environmental domain. The Multiple Use Mandate does not 
elevate one use above all others. Compensatory mitigation measures could off-
set harms to other uses, like the forage available to a rancher, or the access 
available to a recreationist. Consider a rafting company seeking a Special Rec-
reation Permit to operate trips along a stretch of river that serves as an im-
portant watering hole for livestock. If the presence of boats and people will 
degrade the river for ranchers, the BLM could use compensatory mitigation to 
require the rafting company to construct an alternative water supply.392 Simi-
larly, a company that built a mine across a trail providing access to backcoun-
try recreational opportunities, could construct a trail elsewhere leading to the 
same area. Authority to require mitigation for non-environmental harms may, 
however, be somewhat less because the Anti-Degradation Mandate, which tar-
gets only land degradation, would seem inapplicable. 
Despite the promise of equitably allocating federal resources, forging 
compromise and consensus, and facilitating economic and ecological interests, 
compensatory mitigation finds itself in the cross-hairs. It has been swept up in 
a resurgent politics predicated on the belief that economic liberty trumps pub-
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 392 See 16 U.S.C. § 6802(h) (2018). While the BLM may only collect fees from the general public 
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associated fee “for specialized recreation uses of Federal recreational lands and waters, such as group 
activities, recreation events, [and] motorized recreational vehicle use.” Id. 
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lic values like environmental protection. In a moment when many equate com-
promise with surrender, it has few champions. 
Public lands demand better, and often, they have received better. Ameri-
cans across the political spectrum love public lands. Ensuring the health of 
public lands for future generations transcends political party, as demonstrated 
by the strong bipartisan support for the current public lands bill recently passed 
by the Senate.393 Compensatory mitigation, in the right circumstances and un-
der the right conditions, offers an important instrument to forge further consen-
sus and compromise. 
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